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Abstract
Do more people choose to become self-employed when search frictions decline? The origin
story of the gig economy suggests that improvements in communication technologies
increase the self-employment rate, while cross-country evidence suggests the opposite. We
reconcile conventional wisdom with the data by introducing frictions in labour and goods
markets in a new model of self-employment. Declining labour market frictions decrease
self-employment, while declining goods market frictions increase self-employment. We
study the impact of the most salient recent reduction in frictions - the roll-out of broadband
Internet - in a panel of OECD countries. We find that the effect of declining goods market
frictions dominates: the arrival of broadband Internet has halted three quarters of the
average downward trend in self-employment rates.
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1 Introduction
In the popular press, there is the widespread perception that improvements in information
and communication technologies (ICT) have contributed to the rise of own-account work
and self-employment. Increased access to broadband Internet has been accompanied by the
development of new apps that facilitate self-employed handymen and cab drivers finding
customers, supposedly resulting in a “gig economy”.
However, as we will document below, most OECD countries have not experienced any
recent increases in self-employment rates. Falling self-employment rates are consistent with new
evidence showing that labour market frictions are important to explain cross-country variation
in self-employment rates (e.g. Rud and Trapeznikova (2020)). Taking this finding as potential ex-
planation for developments over time, rising payroll employment and falling self-employment
can be expected to result from declining labour market frictions due to improvements in ICT.
Therefore, we ask: do improvements in ICT increase or decrease self-employment?
We propose a parsimonious theory reconciling that declining search frictions may have both
positive and negative effects on the self-employment rate. Our key innovation is to introduce
frictional entry to a centralised goods market in addition to a frictional labour market. Ex ante
identical, risk-averse workers choose between self-employment and searching for a payroll job.
The self-employed face the risk of not selling output on their own, while large firms insure
payroll employees against goods market risk: employees obtain labour income even if their
production cannot be sold in the goods market. However, searching for a payroll job comes
with the risk of unemployment. Moreover, the self-employed are the sole claimants of the fruits
of their labour while employees have to share these with their employers.
The composition of employment arises endogenously as a unique mixed-strategy Nash
equilibrium of workers indifferent between the two types of employment. To understand the
intuition behind this equilibrium, note that employees who can supply their production to
the goods market produce more than the self-employed. They produce more because they
have to cover the costs of vacancies and of insurance for those employees who cannot supply
their production. In compensation, finding a job is more likely than selling production in the
goods market in equilibrium. Now consider an off-equilibrium movement of workers from the
labour market to self-employment. Because payroll employees produce more, moving workers
from the labour market to self-employment acts as a negative supply shock, increasing prices.
The self-employed benefit directly from higher prices through an increase in expected profits.
However, job searchers benefit more; directly from an increase in wages and indirectly via a
higher job-finding probability. These general equilibrium effects pull workers back to the labour
market.
We model the effects of improvements in ICT as reductions in market frictions: they increase
both labour market efficiency and the ease of entry of sellers in the goods market. The main
implication of our theory is that the general equilibrium effect of improvements in ICT on
the self-employment rate can be of arbitrary sign. On the one hand, we show that reductions
in goods market frictions unambiguously increase the self-employment rate. Even though
large firms benefit equally from reductions in goods market frictions, lower goods market
risk decreases the value of insurance that firms offer, increasing the incentives to become
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self-employed.
On the other hand, reductions in labour market frictions make searching for a payroll
job more attractive and decrease the equilibrium self-employment rate. Improvements in
labour market matching efficiency act as a positive supply shock, exerting downward pressure
on prices. Lower prices and higher matching efficiency in the labour market discourage
workers from choosing self-employment and prompt them to search for jobs at firms. We
show that our comparative statics are robust to the introduction of a labour force participation
decision, idiosyncratic preferences for, or costs of, self-employment, and long-term employment
relationships.
To assess which of the two channels dominates, we estimate the effect of the most salient
recent reduction of goods and labour market frictions, the introduction of broadband Internet,
on self-employment. Since our theory is concerned with general equilibrium effects, we use
variation in broadband access across a panel of OECD countries. To account for the possible
endogeneity of broadband Internet, we instrument broadband adoption by a logistic diffusion
model in which the availability of pre-existing technologies predicts broadband penetration,
just as in Czernich, Falck, Kretschmer, and Woessmann (2011).
We find that broadband Internet prompts more self-employment and that this effect is
quantitatively important. Our findings lend support to the interpretation that improvements in
communication technologies have increased the incentives to become self-employed. In the
light of our model, we infer that the general equilibrium effect of broadband Internet on the
self-employment rate resulted from the goods market channel dominating the labour market
channel.
We make three contributions to the literature. Firstly, we propose a novel, tractable model
of selection into self-employment, one that puts technology and market frictions at the center
stage. In fact, our model is orthogonal to the large body of earlier work summarized succinctly
in Parker (2004). This literature focuses on individual heterogeneity as the main determinant
of becoming self-employed. For instance, Lucas (1978), Jovanovic (1982) and Poschke (2013)
assume that being self-employed requires a separate skill, while De Meza and Southey (1996)
find that self-employed entrepreneurs are simply more optimistic than employees. Our theory
relies on risk aversion, similar to Kihlstrom and Laffont (1979). However, unlike theirs, our
theory does not rely on any ex-ante differences among individuals. Similar to Rissman (2003),
self-employment is an alternative to searching for a job in our model. However, she assumes
returns to self-employment are drawn from an exogenous distribution riskier than the wage
distribution. By introducing goods market frictions and large firms providing insurance against
income risk, we offer a model that endogenously generates those risk differentials.1
Our second contribution concerns the effects of modern technologies on the composition
of employment. Preceding the rise of the gig economy, Blau (1987) and Fairlie (2006) showed
the importance of technological change, and personal computers in particular, to explain U.S.
trends in self-employment. We follow Kolko (2012), Akerman, Gaarder, and Mogstad (2015),
Audretsch, Heger, and Veith (2015), Hjort and Poulsen (2019) and Czernich et al. (2011) in
1 Other papers that study the macroeconomic consequences of goods market frictions (e.g. Kaplan and Menzio
(2016), Michaillat and Saez (2015), Petrosky-Nadeau and Wasmer (2015)) do not consider self-employment.
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focusing on the impact of broadband, but investigate its effect on self-employment. Although
economic development has generally been associated with decreases in self-employment rates,
we find that the arrival of broadband Internet has halted three quarters of the average downward
trend in self-employment rates. This finding is robust to the inclusion of important institutional
variables.2
Our third contribution concerns the comparative statics of declining search frictions on the
labour market. Closely related to our theoretical framework are therefore papers that address
the joint determination of payroll employment, unemployment and self-employment rates.
Poschke (2019) and Feng, Lagakos, and Rauch (2018) explain variations in employment status
across a wide range of countries, while Rud and Trapeznikova (2020) focus on Sub-Saharan
Africa. All of these papers stress the importance of labour market frictions, as we do, but
neither considers goods market frictions.3 Allowing for type-of-employment choice and goods
market frictions qualifies the standard results on the effects of increases in matching efficiency
on the job-finding probability and unemployment. When matching efficiency increases, labour
market tightness falls because of congestion caused by workers leaving self-employment. This
insight offers a new perspective on the puzzle, identified by Martellini and Menzio (2020),
why advancements in ICT, prompting higher matching efficiency in the labour market, did
not result in falling unemployment. In our model, only reductions in goods market frictions
unambiguously increase the job-finding probability. Better matching technology in the labour
market may even decrease the job-finding probability when the decrease in self-employment is
sufficiently strong.
2 Model
We consider a stylised one-period economy inhabited by three types of agents - consumers,
workers and firms - that interact in two markets: the goods market and the labour market.
As in Rudanko (2009), workers are risk-averse and hand-to-mouth and can only be insured
against income risk in payroll employment at large, risk-neutral firms.4 We focus on the type-
of-employment choice and the risks associated with self-employment, in addition to the risks of
entering the labour market.
The structure of the model is illustrated in Figure 1. Workers face a choice between self-
employment and payroll-employment. When workers choose to become self-employed, they go
to the goods market directly, where they face the risk of not being able to sell their production.
If, on the other hand, workers choose to seek employment in a firm, they face the risk of
unemployment. Once hired, however, the employee is insured by the firm against the risk in the
goods market. The firms create an endogenously determined measure of vacancies and are able
2 Studies that seek to explain cross-country differences in self-employment rates and focus on institutional
variation include Acs, Audretsch, and Evans (1994), Blanchflower (2000), Parker and Robson (2004), Robson and
Wren (1999), Staber and Bögenhold (1993), Torrini (2005), and Kumar (2012).
3 Other papers model and estimate the flows across payroll, self- and unemployment in a single country, and
assess counterfactual policies (e.g. Bradley (2016) and Narita (2020)), or business cycles (e.g. Visschers, Millan, and
Kredler (2014)).
4 Rudanko (2009) uses slightly different nomenclature. In her model, risk neutral entrepreneurs can open a
continuum of single-worker production units which she refers to as firms. We have large firms that hire a measure
of workers, each staffing a single-worker production unit.
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Figure 1: Overview of the model.
to offer insurance to employees by the virtue of their large size. We formalize this description
and present the relevant details below.
2.1 Model setup
Consumers Consumers live on a unit square [0, 1]× [0, 1] and freely enter a perfectly com-
petitive goods market. Their preferences over the consumption good are captured by a linear
utility function. To acquire qc units of the consumption good at prevailing price p, they pay
with a spot good – the numéraire – that they produce according to a strictly convex production
function g. Thus, given the market price p, the utility of consuming qc reads:
VB(qc; p) = qc − g(pqc).





Note, as the total mass of buyers is equal to 1, this is also the aggregate demand equation.
Workers and Career Choice Workers live on a unit square [0, 1]× [0, 1]. They produce the
consumption good desired by consumers at linear cost, and value the spot good supplied
by consumers. In particular, they have a strictly increasing and strictly concave utility of
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consumption u(c) so that u′(c) > 0 and u′′(c) > 0. We also normalize u(0) = 0.
The workers face a career choice: they can either become self-employed which yields
expected utility VSE, or they can enter the labour market which yields expected utility VLM.
Let 0 ≤ SE ≤ 1 be the share of workers who become self-employed, then A = 1− SE is the
measure of job applicants in the labour market hoping to find a job at a firm. Thus, we rule out
job search during self-employment. Assuming that the type-of-employment choice is exclusive
is simply the extreme version of the assumption that running a viable business (that actually
results in earnings) takes time and reduces job search intensity.
Firms and Labour Market Firms live on a unit segment [0, 1]. The labour market is charac-
terized by search frictions and there is free entry of vacancies. The market is segmented into
sub-markets, indexed with i, distinguished by the terms of trade. Each firm h opens a measure
of vacancies vhi in submarket i at a cost of k units of the numéraire per vacancy. A filled vacancy
becomes a one-worker production unit. Each applicant observes the terms of trade in each






The total number of matches between applicants Ai and vacancies Vi in a sub-market is




i with φ ∈ (0, 1). The parameter
E > 0 captures the exogenous matching efficiency that increases when labour market frictions
fall. Let θi = Vi/Ai be the ratio of vacancies to applicants in a sub-market. The probability
that an individual vacancy is filled is then ζ (θi) = Mi/Vi. Correspondingly, each applicant
finds a job with probability µ (θi) = Mi/Ai.5 Using the definitions of the job filling and job
finding probabilities, we can also write ζ(θ) = Eζ̂(θ) and µ(θ) = Eµ̂(θ) with ζ̂(θ) = θ−φ and
µ̂(θ) = θ1−φ so that ζ̂ ′(θ) < 0, ζ̂ ′′(θ) > 0 and µ̂′(θ) > 0, µ̂′′(θ) < 0.
Frictional Entry in the Goods Market Each self-employed worker and each one-worker
production unit face frictional entry into the competitive goods market: only with probability
λ ∈ (0, 1) can they enter and sell their production.6 We will also say that when a worker
manages to enter the goods market, this worker is visible in the goods market. The motivation
for this formulation is that we think of search frictions in the goods market as consumers simply
not being aware of sellers. Declining search frictions then allow more sellers to compete for the
demand of consumers because they have become visible to them.7 We model declining goods
market frictions as an increase in λ. Hence, we assume that large firms and self-employed
workers benefit equally from reductions in search frictions in the goods market.8
5 We assume throughout that the constraint that these probabilities cannot exceed 1 is not binding.
6 We consider the less tractable case of an endogenous probability to enter the goods market in Appendix
C.3. As we show there, the characterisation of equilibrium and the effects of reductions in search frictions on the
self-employment rate are not affected by this extension.
7 We do not only think of declining search frictions as increasing the likelihood that a seller is visible to a customer,
but also as making it more likely that a previously unknown seller is considered sufficiently trustworthy by a
customer to do business. Although we do not model such mechanisms explicitly, we do believe that ratings and
reviews on platforms have decreased asymmetric information and facilitated trade.
8 One can argue that before the arrival of broadband Internet large firms had smaller problems being visible to
consumers than self-employed workers, so that the self-employed should benefit more from the arrival of broadband.
However, throughout the paper we tie our hands and derive comparative statics for the case in which reductions in
goods market frictions do not result in a higher self-employment rate essentially by assumption.
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Self-Employment The self-employed who do not become visible in the goods market do not
produce and do not earn any income. Thus, the expected value of becoming self-employed and,
upon making it to the goods market, supplying qs, reads:
VSE (qs; p) = λ (u (pqs)− qs) ,





Payroll Employment The law of large numbers applies, so that an individual firm faces no
uncertainty. The firm receives expected profits and can commit to pay salaries to employees who
were hired but whose production units did not become visible in the goods market. Workers
who do not find a job become unemployed and receive unemployment benefits b.
Employment contracts are characterised by greater complexity than spot trades in markets
for goods. To allow firms to post optimal contracts, we set up a competitive search environment
in the labour market. In this environment, the expected value of going to a sub-market cannot
be less than the market utility VLM. Following the standard argument in such models with
homogeneous workers and firms, there will be exactly one sub-market active and hence we
scrap the i index. The firms post a contract characterised by (θ, w, l, d) in a sub-market with
tightness θ that will involve paying d when the production unit is not visible in the goods
market, and that otherwise will pay a wage rate w and will require the worker to produce l.
The contract solves the constrained optimisation problem to maximize expected per-vacancy
profit Π, taking as given the expected utility VLM that applicants obtain in the labour market:
max
l,θ,w,d
ζ(θ) (λ(p− w)l − (1− λ)d) ≡ Π
subject to: µ(θ) (λ (u(wl)− l) + (1− λ)u(d)) + (1− µ(θ))u(b) ≥ VLM
We derive the properties of this contract in Appendix A.1. Notably, the risk-neutral firm finds it
optimal to fully insure the risk-averse workers against the goods market income risk:
wl = d.
Hence, we can scrap d completely such that the expected profit per vacancy and the market
utility constraint become, respectively:
Π = ζ (θ) (λp− w) l,
µ (θ) (u (wl)− λl) + (1− µ(θ)) u(b) ≥ VLM.
The employees always receive income wl but produce only when their production unit is visible
7





φ (λp− w) l = (1− φ) u(wl)− λl − u(b)
u′(wl)
. (4)
Furthermore, there is one sub-market with tightness θ = V/A = V/(1− SE). As there is free
entry of vacancies, firm profits per vacancy must be zero:
k = ζ (θ) (λp− w) l. (5)
2.2 Equilibrium
To close the model we require the goods market to clear. The market-clearing equilibrium
price is defined implicitly as a price for which aggregate demand equals aggregate supply. The
formal equilibrium concept we are after is a mixed-strategy solution to the career choice, one
in which payroll- and self-employment co-exist, pursuing each type of employment yields the
same expected utility, and workers randomize between them.
Definition 1 (Mixed-strategy career-choice equilibrium) A mixed-strategy career-choice equilib-
rium (MSCC-equilibrium) is a tuple (SE, p, qs, qc, w, l, θ) such that:
• 0 < SE < 1, 0 < θ, both types of employment are chosen in equilibrium and active in the goods
market,9
• given p, each consumer demands qc as prescribed by equation (1), each visible self-employed sells
qs given by equation (2) and θ, w, l satisfy equations (3) - (5),
• given θ, w, l, qc and qs, p and SE simultaneously clear the goods market and make workers
indifferent between self-employment and searching for a job at a firm:
λ (SEqs + (1− SE)µ(θ)l) = qc, (6)
VSE = λ (u(pqs)− qs) = µ (θ) (u(wl)− λl) + (1− µ(θ))u(b) = VLM. (7)
The equilibrium is a vector consisting of 7 variables that jointly solve equations (1) - (7). In
an MSCC-equilibrium, workers are indifferent between the two careers and randomize over
them. The endogenously determined self-employment rate SE is the weight assigned to self-
employment in this randomisation.
3 Analytical results
We proceed by describing the MSCC-equilibrium in our model. We start with some analytical
observations assuming an equilibrium exists. Then, we explain how to construct an MSCC-
equilibrium. Next, we derive comparative statics with respect to reductions in frictions in the
9 Note that with θ = 0 there would be no payroll employment.
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goods and in the labour market. Finally, we discuss the role of the main assumptions in our
model, and we conclude by presenting three extensions to our framework.
3.1 MSCC equilibrium: characterisation, existence and comparative statics
Lemma 1 Let (SE, p, qs, qc, w, l, θ) be an MSCC-equilibrium. Then:
1. wl = pqs, w < p, and l > qs: an employee produces more than a self-employed. For u(b) = 0,
also µ(θ)l > qs: the expected production of an applicant is larger than that of a self-employed.
2. There exists a differentiable and strictly increasing function ψ(p) such that the workers’ career-
choice indifference reads:
VSE = λψ(p) = u(b) + µ(θ)φ [ψ(p)− u(b)] = VLM, (8)
the free-entry condition becomes:
k = ζ(θ) (1− φ) p [ψ(p)− u(b)] , (9)
and the sharing rule can be written as:
λl = (1− φ) [ψ(p)− u(b)] + qs. (10)
Furthermore, when u(b) = 0, then also λ < µ(θ): securing income is more likely in payroll than
in self-employment.
3. The demand function is strictly monotone: dqc/dp < 0.
The proof is provided in Appendix A.2. For workers who secure it, labour income is
equalized between the two careers in equilibrium, because the linear cost of effort makes the
utility between firms and workers transferable. However, the employees who staff production
units that are visible in the goods market produce more per capita than the visible self-employed,
for two reasons. First, because they must generate profits to cover the vacancy creation costs,
which explains the difference between qs and λl. Indeed, the expected markup of production
by an employee over that of a visible self-employed measured in units of the numéraire exactly
covers the expected recruiting costs k/ζ(θ) per employee, as merging (9) and (10) reveals:





Second, employees produce more than the self-employed because they pay for the insurance
against the goods market risk that all employees obtain, by producing the additional (1− λ)l.10
10 As we abstract from leisure in the model, qs and l should be interpreted in terms of production (and not as
hours worked) which result from an identical production function for firms and the self-employed. Therefore, the
model predicts employees to be more productive per capita than the self-employed at the cost of a higher disutility
of effort in payroll employment.
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Lemma 1 highlights how the structure of the model simplifies, helping us to reduce the
dimensionality of the problem of finding an equilibrium. The linear cost of effort allows us
to write the terms of the employment contract solely as a function of p, just as the decisions
of consumers and the self-employed. Given the price p we can thus obtain qc, qs, l and w. As
a result, we are left with three nonlinear equations – workers’ indifference (8), free entry of
vacancies (9) and goods market clearing (6) – in three unknowns: p, θ and SE. Finally, aggregate
demand is strictly decreasing in price p.
However, there are still two remaining obstacles to solving this reduced system of equations.
First, through the linear effort assumption, we have taken a particular stand on the separability
of the worker’s consumption and labour supply. As a result, for some specifications of the
utility function u(c), the supply decision of the self-employed (2) might be non-monotone in
price p. This non-monotonicity may carry over to the equilibrium level of employee production
l by virtue of equation (10). When this happens, aggregate supply – the left-hand side of the
goods market clearing condition (6) – becomes non-monotone in price p, which may lead to a
multiplicity of equilibria. To rule out this possibility, we make the following assumption.
Assumption 1 (Monotone aggregate supply) The utility function u(c) is such that dqs/dp > 0.
This assumption is analogous to the absence of a wealth effect on labour supply, as in
the case of GHH preferences. This condition is met by CRRA utility functions of the form
u(c) = A c
1−γ
1−γ with γ ∈ (0, 1) , A > 0, which is a common choice in quantitative and applied
work using models similar to ours (see e.g. Berentsen, Menzio, and Wright (2011)). Note that
through (10), Assumption 1 also guarantees that dl/dp > 0.11
The second obstacle is due to the presence of unemployment benefits b. Unemployment
insurance (UI) not only affects the division of the surplus between employees and firms, but
also the workers’ indifference condition unless u(b) = 0. The constructive proof of Theorem
1, our first main result, explains that the equilibrium with u(b) = 0 exists in a region of the
parameter space. The existence of an equilibrium with positive unemployment benefits then
boils down to the existence of a solution to an ordinary differential equation with respect to u(b)
with an initial condition equal to u(b) = 0. We offer more details on this differential equation in
Appendix C.1.
Theorem 1 (Existence of equilibrium without UI) Suppose u(b) = 0. Then, there exist numbers
0 < k(λ, φ) < k(λ, φ) < ∞ such that an MSCC equilibrium exists and is unique, if λ < φ and
k ∈
(
k(λ, φ), k(λ, φ)
)
.
Proof. When there is no UI, the equilibrium conditions (8) - (9) simplify to:
λ = φµ(θ), (11)
k = ζ(θ)(1− φ)pψ(p). (12)
For given λ and φ, worker’s indifference (11) pins down the equilibrium market tightness θ∗,
unless λ and φ are such that this equation has no solution, meaning that there is only one type
11 Even for preferences that do not satisfy Assumption 1, we could ensure uniqueness of an MSCC-equilibrium
by choosing an appropriate buyers’ production function g, resulting in an aggregate demand function that crosses
supply only once.
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Figure 2: Aggregate supply curves for two levels of the self-employment rate, SE∗ and SEH with
SE∗ < SEH, crossing the aggregate demand curve, such that the goods market clears for SE∗
at an equilibrium price p∗ consistent with tightness θ∗ pinned down by workers’ indifference.
Note, the lowest value on the vertical axis is greater than zero.
of employment in equilibrium. Given θ∗, the equilibrium price p∗ is pinned down by free-entry
condition (12) for a given k. Finally, an MSCC equilibrium exists if, and only if, there exists a
self-employment rate SE∗ ∈ (0, 1) such that the goods market clears given p∗ and θ∗.
By virtue of Assumption 1 there is at most one self-employment rate that clears the goods
market. For a given value of p, the quantities produced qs and l are fixed, so that moving the
self-employment rate amounts to shifting the aggregate supply curve, since Lemma 1 shows
that µ(θ)l > qs. We illustrate this algebraic route to finding the equilibrium in Figure 2 with two
values of the self-employment rate, SE∗ and SEH, with SE∗ < SEH. For each self-employment
rate, there exists a corresponding aggregate supply curve, for a fixed value of labour market
tightness θ∗ (pinned down by workers’ indifference in (11)) and fixed qs and l pinned down by
the equilibrium price p∗ (implied by free entry in (12)).
The bounds
(
k(λ, φ), k(λ, φ)
)
on the vacancy posting cost compatible with an MSCC-
equilibrium can be found by considering the limiting cases of SE 7→ 0+ and SE 7→ 1−. The
limiting case of SE 7→ 1− yields the highest price level p̄, and SE 7→ 0+ yields the lowest price
level p which results in an MSCC-equilibrium for a given θ∗. These bounds map one-to-one to
bounds on the vacancy-creation cost k, ensuring that the price level that clears the goods market
is consistent with 0 < SE < 1. Therefore, for sufficiently high values of k there will be no payroll
employment, and for sufficiently low k there might be no self-employment. Furthermore, the
larger λ and φ are, the lower the values of the vacancy-creation cost k that are consistent with
existence of the equilibrium. In Appendix C.2 we solve for an equilibrium for one particular
11
0 1
Figure 3: Expected utility of each career – entering self-employment or the labour market – as a
function of the self-employment rate, while the goods market clears and free entry of vacancies
holds for all self-employment rates. Figure created with u(c) = 2
√
c and b = 0.
example of the matching and utility functions.
This description of how to construct an MSCC-equilibrium starts with the premise that
workers are indifferent between careers. To understand the economic intuition behind the
equilibrating forces in the model, consider taking some workers away from the labour market
and making them enter self-employment instead, while keeping the free-entry and goods-
market clearing conditions satisfied. When more workers enter self-employment, they decrease
congestion in the labour market, which benefits applicants. The free-entry condition requires
that firms are compensated for a tighter labour market with a higher price, which increases
the surplus per filled vacancy. The price rises because the self-employed produce less than
applicants. As a result, increasing the self-employment rate benefits job applicants via two
channels. First, a higher self-employment rate increases the price and thus the surplus to
be shared with employees. Second, the remaining applicants enjoy a greater likelihood of
finding a job. The self-employed benefit only from the first effect. Formally, these effects of the


















However, as in any equilibrium λ = φµ(θ), the self-employed and applicants benefit equally
from the change in prices and the net price effect on workers’ indifference is nil. Consequently,
the effect of an increase in the job-finding rate is decisive and pulls workers back to the labour
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market. We illustrate these considerations in Figure 3. When SE > SE∗, the expected utility of
becoming an applicant exceeds that of pursuing self-employment, VSE < VLM, pulling workers
into the labour market. The converse is true for SE < SE∗.
Our second main result is on the comparative statics of the self-employment rate with respect
to matching efficiency in the labour market E and ease of entry in the goods market λ. Even
though we rely mostly on the special case of zero unemployment benefits when explaining the
intuition behind the results below, we show in the proofs that the results also hold for u(b) > 0.
Theorem 2 (Reductions in frictions and the self-employment rate) In any MSCC-equilibrium,
a higher probability of selling in the goods market increases the equilibrium self-employment rate,
dSE/dλ > 0, and increases the job-finding probability, dµ(θ)/dλ > 0. Improvements in matching
efficiency in the labour market decrease the self-employment rate, dSE/dE < 0, and at least weakly
decrease the job-finding probability, dµ(θ)/dE ≤ 0.
The proof is provided in Appendix A.3. The direct effect of an increase in λ is to increase
the likelihood of securing income in self-employment. For workers to remain indifferent, the
job-finding probability must also increase, which requires labour market tightness to rise. A
higher market tightness decreases the job-filling rate, and for the free-entry condition to remain
satisfied, prices need to rise. Prices need to rise because due to the insurance in the equilibrium
contract, firms do not directly benefit from increases in λ, as can be seen in (9). In equilibrium,
higher prices and a higher labour market tightness result from a higher self-employment rate,
since the self-employed produce less and do not congest the labour market. As a result, an
increase in λ increases the equilibrium self-employment rate and the job-finding probability.
When labour market matching efficiency E increases, it raises the job-filling probability.
Firms open more vacancies, attracting workers from self-employment. However, when u(b) = 0,
the equilibrium market tightness is fixed by worker’s indifference in (11): the equilibrium job
finding probability µ(θ) cannot change when λ remains fixed. Hence, any increase in matching
efficiency E must be exactly offset by adjustment in θ, which happens by the inflow of workers
from self-employment. When u(b) > 0, the motive to abandon self-employment is even stronger.
In this case, the congestion created by the inflow of workers from self-employment overturns
the effects of the initial increase in E. Consequently, an increase in matching efficiency decreases
the self-employment rate and cannot increase the job-finding probability. In equilibrium, prices
fall because payroll employment is higher.
As a result, our model offers a new perspective on the puzzle identified by Martellini and
Menzio (2020). They wonder why unemployment does not show a trend despite apparent
improvements in labour market efficiency. In our model, because of type-of-employment choice
and goods market frictions, better matching technology in the labour market does not increase
the job-finding probability, while reductions in goods market frictions do.12
12 The effect of a better matching technology in the labour market on the job-finding probability depends to a
certain extent on the assumption of an exogenous probability to enter the goods market. We show in Appendix




To further explain the workings of the model, we turn to its two main assumptions. The first
assumption is that large firms insure workers against goods market risk. The second assumption
is that workers can freely choose their type of employment.
3.2.1 Importance of income risk
Our model of type-of-employment choice relies on differences in the exposure to risk in payroll-
and self-employment. We show here that these differences are the raison d’etre of an MSCC-
equilibrium. In the baseline model, firms enjoy the benefits of the law of large numbers. By the
virtue of their size, they can guarantee income also to workers staffing production units that
did not become visible in the goods market. Now suppose that firms were one-worker firms
instead, so that they would only be able to pay a wage upon being visible in the goods market.
The optimal contract-posting problem would then read:
max
θ,w,l
ζ (θ) λ (p− w) l
subject to: µ (θ) λ (u (wl)− l) + (1− µ(θ)) u(b) ≥ VLM.





φλ (p− w) l = (1− φ) λ (u(wl)− l)− u(b)
u′(wl)
, (15)
while the adjusted free-entry condition is:
k = ζ(θ)λ (p− w) l. (16)
Given these conditions, we can now provide the definition of a mixed-strategy career-choice
equilibrium adjusted to one-worker firms.
Definition 2 (MSCC-equilibrium with one-worker firms) A mixed-strategy career-choice equi-
librium with 1-worker firms is a tuple (SE, p, qs, qc, w, l, θ) such that:
• 0 < SE < 1, 0 < θ, both types of employment are chosen in equilibrium and active in the goods
market,
• given p, each consumer demands qc as prescribed by equation (1), each self-employed sells qs given
by equation (2) and θ, w, l satisfy equations (14) - (16) given p,
• given θ, w, l, qc and qs, p and SE simultaneously clear the goods market as in (6) and make workers
indifferent between self-employment and searching for a job at a firm:
VSE = λ (u(pqs)− qs) = µ (θ) λ (u(wl)− l) + (1− µ(θ))u(b) = VLM. (17)
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It turns out that such an equilibrium could only exist under knife-edge conditions that make
the type-of-employment choice ill-defined.
Proposition 1 If an MSCC-equilibrium with one-worker firms exists, then k = 0. Not only the incomes
in the two types of employment are equalised, wl = pqs, but so are the quantities produced, l = qs, so
that wages equal prices, w = p. Workers are indifferent not only between self-employment and entering
the labour market, but also between payroll- and unemployment.
Proof. We provide the sketch of the main features of this equilibrium here, and fill in the
remaining details in Appendix A.4. We find that the workers’ indifference condition and the
free-entry condition, respectively, become:
λψ(p) = u(b), (18)
k = ζ(θ)(1− φ)p [λψ(p)− u(b)] . (19)
The workers’ indifference condition (18) means that the expected value of self-employment,
VSE = λψ(p), must be equal to that of receiving (positive) unemployment insurance with
certainty, VLM = u(b). This is only the case when the employment contract delivers
λ (u(wl)− l) = u(b) to the employees. Job applicants are thus indifferent between unem-
ployment and finding a job. However, such an employment contract is only possible when
l = qs and w = p, so that the difference between payroll- and self-employment disappears.
Moreover, as λψ(p)− u(b) also features in the free-entry condition, workers’ indifference is
only consistent with vacancy creation when k = 0. For a given b, firms then must open ex-
actly so many vacancies such that aggregate supply results in a price such that the condition
λψ(p) = u(b) is satisfied.
A similar insight can be derived in the baseline model with large firms, under parameter
values that render the insurance offered by firms irrelevant. To see this, consider the case
with u(b) = 0 for simplicity, so that equilibrium is described by conditions (11) - (12). Now
suppose that the frictions in the goods market completely vanish: λ 7→ 1. Then, an MSCC
equilibrium can only exist when employees capture the full surplus from the match, φ 7→ 1,
and search frictions in the labour market vanish as well, µ(θ) 7→ 1. However, a job-finding
probability tending to one is only compatible with costless job creation by the virtue of (9), so
that k must tend to zero. Furthermore, (10) implies that l = qs in the limit, and thus w = p.
Consequently, when λ 7→ 1, payroll- and self-employment become exactly identical so that the
type-of-employment choice margin is ill-defined again.
Therefore, payroll employment can be interpreted as a costly insurance mechanism that
is delivered by firms against goods market risk. If such insurance either cannot be provided
or is irrelevant, payroll- and self-employment become indistinguishable, and the creation of
payroll employment must happen at no cost. Otherwise, the only equilibrium is a corner case
of SE = 1.
3.2.2 Consequences of ignoring type-of-employment choice
Theorem 2 shows that our model overturns the standard result on the effect of matching
efficiency on the job-finding rate. To highlight that allowing workers to choose their type of
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employment is the reason for this implication of the model, we define an equilibrium without
type-of-employment choice, in which the self-employment rate is exogenously fixed. Such an
equilibrium can be rationalised, for example, by assuming that selection into self-employment
is purely based on individual-specific preferences or costs, regardless of the income differential
between the two types of employment.
Definition 3 (Fixed career-choice equilibrium) A fixed career-choice equilibrium (FCC-
equilibrium) is a tuple (p, qs, qc, w, l, θ) such that, given SE ∈ (0, 1):
• given p, each consumer demands qc as prescribed by equation (1), each self-employed sells qs given
by equation (2) and θ, w, l satisfy equations (3) - (5) given p,
• price p clears the goods market so that equation (6) holds.
When we fix the split of workers between self-employment and pursuing a career at a firm,
the predictions on how reductions in search frictions in the goods and the labour market affect
the job-finding rate change their signs, as summarised in the following result.
Proposition 2 (Comparative statics of reductions in search frictions in FCC-equilibrium)
For any FCC-equilibrium, the job-finding probability decreases in the ease of entry in the goods market
and increases in the matching efficiency in the labour market, dµ(θ)/dλ < 0 and dµ(θ)/dE > 0.
The proof is provided in Appendix A.5. Ignoring type-of-employment choice may therefore
lead to incorrect inference on the effect of improvements in labour market matching efficiency
on unemployment. This prediction changes sign because the inflow of workers from self-
employment, which (more than) offsets the initial increase in the job-finding probability in
an MSCC-equilibrium, is ruled out in an FCC-equilibrium. The effect of λ on the job-finding
probability also switches sign, for two reasons. First, improvements in goods market frictions
act as a positive supply shock that decreases the price level, depressing job creation by large
firms. Second, the resulting decrease in labour market tightness is not mitigated by job appli-
cants leaving the labour market for self-employment. This adjustment in the composition of
employment, in the baseline model, led to a price increase, and this mechanism is absent in an
FCC-equilibrium.
3.3 Extensions
Our parsimonious framework focuses on risk differentials and hence abstracts from other
aspects of the type-of-employment choice. In this section we show how the model can be
extended with three of them. First, we address the difference in permanency between payroll-
and self-employment. Second, we introduce inactive workers in the model, making participation
in the labour force a costly choice. Third, we allow for individual preferences for, or costs of,
self-employment.
3.3.1 Payroll employment as a long-term relationship
The static model cannot capture the long-term nature of many payroll employment relationships.
To include long-term employment relationships, we build a dynamic version of the model. In
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this model, agents discount future utilities at a rate of β and employee-vacancy matches are
destroyed at the end of each period with probability δ. Production cannot be stored. Here we
discuss how this dynamic extension affects the existence of an MSCC equilibrium, while the
details and generalisations of our earlier results can be found in Appendix C.4. The dynamic
counterparts to equilibrium conditions (11) and (12) are:
λ =
µ(θ)φ
1− (1− µ(θ)φ) β(1− δ) ,
k =
ζ(θ)(1− φ)
1− (1− µ(θ)φ) β(1− δ) pψ(p).
The conditions of the static model are a special case of these equations when all payroll jobs are
destroyed at the end of the first period, δ = 1. The steady-state payroll employment PE is:
PE =
µ (θ)
µ (θ) + δ (1− µ(θ)) (1− SE) ,
so that the goods market clears for:
λ
(
SEqs + (1− SE)
µ (θ)
µ (θ) + δ (1− µ(θ)) l
)
= qc.
Qualitatively, this model works exactly as the baseline case and the comparative statics are
identical. Moving away from the special case of δ = 1 and keeping the same λ requires a lower
job finding rate µ(θ) to support an MSCC-equilibrium in the dynamic model. This is because
the long-term nature of payroll employment is an additional benefit to applicants. To restore
indifference between the two careers, the self-employment rate must be smaller than in the
static model.
3.3.2 Participation margin
In the baseline model we focus on active members of the labour force. We can extend the model
with inactive workers by postulating a fixed cost of labour force participation. Without loss of
generality, let this cost be distributed according to Unif[0,1] × F(j), on the unit square inhabited
by workers, where F(j) is a continuous cdf.13 Let workers indexed with j ∈ [0, 1] pay a cost ca(j)
upon entering the labour force, with c′a(j) ≥ 0. This cost cancels out in the type-of-employment
choice and is sunk at the contract-posting stage in the labour market. Focusing on the more
tractable case of u(b) = 0, the adjustments to the equilibrium conditions are:
A = (1− SE)F(j),
F(j)λ (SEqs + (1− SE)µ(θ)l) = qc,
λψ(p) = µ(θ)φψ(p) ≥ ca(j).
13 This permits us to consider a threshold, instead of a continuum of thresholds, for the participation decision of
workers.
17
The first equation simply states that SE is the share of active workers who choose self-
employment. The second equation is the goods-market clearing condition adjusted for partic-
ipation. Finally, the values of entering the labour market or self-employment, VLM and VSE,
either pin down the equilibrium index j∗ < 1 that solves the three equations with a binding
equality, or exceed c(j) so that j∗ = 1 and F(j∗) = 1 and even the highest participation cost is
covered in equilibrium.
Theorem 2 is robust to this extension, as the effects of E and λ on p and θ are not affected
by the participation margin. Consider, for example, an increase in λ. The differentiation of the
free-entry condition and workers’ indifference goes through exactly as in the baseline model.
Consequently, it is still the case that the equilibrium price p must increase when λ increases.
Therefore, declining goods market frictions increase the value of self-employment VSE and also
lead to higher participation as long as j∗ < 1. Higher participation exerts a downward pressure
on the equilibrium price, so that the eventual increase in p comes from the newly active workers
selecting disproportionately more into self-employment.
3.3.3 Preference for self-employment
Last, but not least, the model can be extended with a cost of or premium to self-employment, by
making distributional assumptions analogous to costs of labour force participation. In particular,
assume that workers indexed with j ∈ [0, 1] pay a cost cse(j) if they enter self-employment,
with c′se(j) ≥ 0. This general specification can capture, e.g., preferences for being one’s own
boss (Hurst and Pugsley, 2011), or financial frictions (Buera, 2009, Evans and Jovanovic, 1989)
in reduced form. Negative values of cse(j) then correspond to individual preferences for or
subsidies to self-employment. For a continuous distribution of cse(j) with sufficiently broad
support, the marginal workers j∗ are pinned down by the indifference condition:
λψ(p)− cse(j∗) = φµ(θ)ψ(p),
and SE = F(j∗). The shifter cse(j) is irrelevant for the contract-posting problem, and also the
free-entry condition is the same as in the baseline model. Then, any equilibrium of the baseline
model can be regarded as an equilibrium of this economy with the distribution of cse such that
the equilibrium index j∗ has cse(j∗) = 0.
In the case of a continuous distribution of cse, the preference for self-employment tames the
responses of the equilbrium self-employment rate to λ and E. The next type in the distribution
of cse(j) is less inclined to take up self-employment than the j∗-th type, so that the effects of
shocks that increase the self-employment rate in the baseline model are now muted. The same
goes for shocks that would decrease the self-employment rate, because the affected workers
were more inclined than the marginal worker to select into self-employment.
4 Empirical Results
The theoretical model yields sharp predictions for the response of the aggregate self-employment
rate to the parameters that capture the magnitude of search frictions in the goods and in the
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labour market. However, in practice it is hard to distinguish reductions in labour market
frictions from reductions in goods market frictions. Instead, we study the effect of the most
salient recent reduction in market frictions, the roll-out of broadband Internet.
High-speed Internet has been accompanied by the development and use of platforms and
other apps that facilitate trade. We think of these innovations as increasing the likelihood that
a seller can be found by a customer. Because broadband Internet penetration measures the
extent to which customers and the self-employed have access to these technologies, we use
it as proxy for λ.Internet also facilitates conventional job search and recruiting (Autor, 2001,
Stevenson, 2009). It has reduced both the costs of job applications and the costs of screening
each application. Although the interaction of these cost reductions is not unambiguous (see e.g.
Albrecht et al. (2006)), there is some evidence of increases in matching efficiency (Martellini and
Menzio, 2020). We therefore use broadband penetration as a proxy for E as well.
We test whether broadband Internet penetration, which we expect to reduce search frictions,
correlates with self-employment rates or not. If there is a significant effect of broadband Internet
on self-employment, we can use its sign to learn whether the goods market or the labour
market channel dominates. The former would correspond to a positive effect of Internet on the
self-employment rate while the latter to a negative effect. Because we explicitly aim to study
general equilibrium effects, we need to test the strength of our channels at the level of the entire
market. Thus, we rely on longitudinal cross-country variation in self-employment rates and
broadband Internet.
Switching careers may take time. To allow the effects of the reductions in frictions to be
distributed over time, we follow the literature (Parker, 2004, Robson and Wren, 1999) and
specify a generalized error-correction model:
∆ ln SEit = β∆Xit + ωXit−1 − γ ln SEit + αi + ψt + ε it. (20)
In this equation, the dependent variable is the difference of (the logarithm of) the self-
employment rate. On the right-hand side we have country and time fixed-effect variables
αi and ψt, respectively. These control for country-specific invariant characteristics, e.g. cultural
attitudes to entrepreneurship, and for common time variation, e.g. the global business cycle. Xit
denotes a list of regressors which we describe below. Following the logic of the error-correction
model, the β coefficients estimate the short-run effects of Xit on the dependent variable, while
the ratios ω/|γ|measure the long-run effects.
4.1 Data
Self-employment rates For the composition of employment we sample ILOSTAT data. Even
though, in the model, all self-employed face the same amount of income risk, in reality, they
are a heterogeneous group in this regard. On the one hand, it is fair to argue that members
of producers’ cooperatives enjoy some insurance provided by the cooperative. An employer
running a large incorporated business with many employees does not fit the definition of
the self-employed in the model either. However, focusing solely on own-account workers
omits unincorporated employers with very few employees who have similar characteristics to
19
Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom United States
Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal Spain
Hungary Ireland Italy Japan Korea
Denmark Finland France Germany Greece
Australia Austria Belgium Canada Czech Republic





































Figure 4: Self-employment (SE) and own-account work (OA) shares in labour force (in percent-
ages) for 24 OECD countries between 1998 and 2017.
own-account workers, as shown by Levine and Rubinstein (2016).
To address these concerns, we use two proxies for the SEit variable in equation (20): self-
employment and own-account work. We define the Self-Employment rate as the share of the
self-employed in the labour force and the Own-Account Work rate as the share of own-account
workers in the labour force. Figure 4 presents the evolution of these variables between 1998
and 2017 for the 24 OECD countries for which we have information on broadband Internet as
well. We see that self-employment is either flat or decreasing, except for the Czech Republic,
Netherlands, and the United Kingdom.
Broadband The broadband penetration rate is defined as the number of broadband sub-
scribers per 100 inhabitants.14 We take these data from the ITU World Telecommunication/ICT
Indicators Database, in which broadband Internet appears in 1998 (in seven countries only,
with each less than 0.5% penetration). To control for potential endogeneity, which could arise if
an increase in gig-economy self-employment would prompt further investment in broadband
technology, we follow the instrumental-variable approach introduced in Czernich et al. (2011).
The idea behind this instrument is that the most commonly used broadband standards use
pre-existing infrastructure to connect homes and small- and medium-sized firms to the larger
network. In particular, the copper wire of the voice telephony network and the coaxial cable of
the cable TV network are employed to connect individual users to the Internet. Since the voice
telephony and cable TV network have been built for other purposes than broadband Internet,
they provide valid instruments for broadband penetration.
Instrument relevance has been shown by Czernich et al. (2011). They find that the adoption
14 Broadband Internet offers download speeds of at least 256 kbit/s. One subscription usually covers the whole
household/establishment.
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Table 1: Effects of Broadband Internet on Self-Employment Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ SE rate ∆ SE rate ∆ SE rate ∆ SE rate ∆ SE rate ∆ SE rate
Lagged SE rate -0.074*** -0.074*** -0.100*** -0.185*** -0.090*** -0.176***
(0.020) (0.021) (0.028) (0.032) (0.020) (0.036)
∆ Predicted B-band 0.024*** 0.025*** 0.020** 0.042*** 0.029*** 0.038***
(0.008) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.012)
Lagged Predicted B-band 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.002** 0.006*** 0.004*** 0.006***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002)
∆ GDP 0.008 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.034
(0.073) (0.080) (0.076) (0.082) (0.080)
Lagged GDP 0.011 0.025 -0.009 0.037 -0.023
(0.028) (0.030) (0.032) (0.029) (0.038)
∆ Replacement Rate 0.000 0.038
(0.011) (0.031)
Lagged Replacement Rate -0.010 0.008
(0.006) (0.020)
∆ Public Sector -0.066* -0.015
(0.035) (0.045)
Lagged Public Sector -0.104*** -0.105***
(0.027) (0.030)
∆ Tax Burden 0.036 0.058
(0.038) (0.039)
Lagged Tax Burden -0.012 -0.003
(0.020) (0.022)
Observations 456 456 384 249 408 211
No. countries 24 24 24 22 24 22
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.001 0.009
AR(1) coefficient 0.117 0.118 0.124 0.112 0.133 0.227
Modified Wald p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
RSS 0.305 0.305 0.253 0.101 0.274 0.081
MSS 0.038 0.038 0.033 0.036 0.039 0.024
RMSE 0.027 0.027 0.026 0.022 0.028 0.022
R-squared 0.110 0.111 0.115 0.261 0.125 0.231
* p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of the Self-Employment rate. The
sample is 24 OECD countries in years 1998-2017. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
of broadband Internet is well-described by a logistic diffusion curve, where the pre-existing
voice telephony and cable TV infrastructure places a bound on the maximum reach of the
broadband network in a country. Broadband penetration for each country and year can then
be predicted with a nonlinear regression, featuring the maximum reach, the speed, and the
inflection point of the diffusion process as parameters. Moreover, Czernich et al. (2011) show that
the pre-existing infrastructure of the cable TV and voice telephony networks has no predictive
value for the penetration of mobile telephony and computers, two other technologies that have
been widely adopted around the same time as broadband Internet. Regarding the first-stage
estimation, we merely extend their work to a longer time period. We report the details of this
exercise, which results in our regressor Predicted Broadband, in Appendix B.3.
Additional regressors At the benefit of its analytical tractability, our parsimonious model
necessarily abstracts from several variables that the literature has found to impact cross-country
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Table 2: Effects of Broadband Internet on Own-Account Work
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ OA rate ∆ OA rate ∆ OA rate ∆ OA rate ∆ OA rate ∆ OA rate
Lagged OA rate -0.112*** -0.110*** -0.112*** -0.186*** -0.107*** -0.213***
(0.027) (0.026) (0.033) (0.032) (0.029) (0.041)
∆ Predicted B-band 0.017* 0.018* 0.020* 0.050*** 0.029*** 0.050***
(0.009) (0.008) (0.011) (0.012) (0.007) (0.016)
Lagged Predicted B-band 0.002* 0.002* 0.003* 0.007*** 0.004*** 0.008***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
∆ GDP -0.158 -0.180 -0.127 -0.179 -0.116
(0.106) (0.114) (0.099) (0.111) (0.104)
Lagged GDP -0.002 -0.000 -0.055 0.024 -0.066
(0.048) (0.039) (0.043) (0.045) (0.050)
∆ Replacement Rate -0.003 0.029
(0.011) (0.041)
Lagged Replacement Rate -0.008 0.000
(0.010) (0.027)
∆ Public Sector -0.071 -0.030
(0.046) (0.059)
Lagged Public Sector -0.102*** -0.127***
(0.034) (0.039)
∆ Tax Burden -0.020 -0.007
(0.027) (0.052)
Lagged Tax Burden -0.013 -0.001
(0.022) (0.029)
Observations 456 456 384 249 408 211
No. countries 24 24 24 22 24 22
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-test p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.026
AR(1) coefficient 0.072 0.071 0.0577 0.127 0.058 0.193
Modified Wald p-value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
RSS 0.553 0.550 0.428 0.175 0.467 0.139
MSS 0.078 0.081 0.050 0.055 0.059 0.038
RMSE 0.036 0.036 0.034 0.029 0.035 0.029
R-squared 0.123 0.128 0.104 0.239 0.112 0.213
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Note: The dependent variable is the change in the logarithm of the Own Account Work rate. The
sample is 24 OECD countries in years 1998-2017. Robust standard errors in parentheses.
self-employment rates. Because omitting such factors would likely bias our results, we incorpo-
rate four additional regressors in our analysis. First, we control for GDP per capita, GDP. The
earlier literature finds a negative relationship between the general level of economic develop-
ment, proxied with GDP per capita, and the self-employment rate (Acs et al., 1994, Poschke,
2019).
Second, we account for the generosity of the official unemployment insurance system. In
particular, following Parker and Robson (2004), Staber and Bögenhold (1993), Torrini (2005) and
Kumar (2012), we control for the Replacement Rate, defined as the ratio of the unemployment
benefit to the median wage. The more generous the UI system, the more likely prospective
workers are to engage in job search rather than self-employment. This can arise due to moral
hazard problems which make monitoring search effort difficult.15
15 In Appendix C.1 we derive analytically, under parametric assumptions, that the introduction of UI adversely
affects the equilibrium self-employment rate.
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Third, following Parker and Robson (2004), Robson and Wren (1999) and Torrini (2005), the
choice to become a self-employed can also be driven by tax evasion. Therefore, the higher taxes
are, the larger the self-employment rate is likely to be. We thus define the Tax Burden as the
average of the tax wedge for a single-earner household, and married couples with two children
and a single earner.
Finally, we introduce the Public Sector variable as the share of public-sector employment in
total employment, which is shown to be relevant for the aggregate self-employment rates in
Torrini (2005). This variable proxies for the incidence of safe, stable jobs in the economy. There-
fore, we expect that countries with big public-sector employment have lower self-employment
rates. The justification for this hypothesis is that even though firms in our model offer perfect
insurance, in reality there are certain impediments for them to do so (e.g. moral hazard) and
government jobs come with stability. Further details of how the variables were constructed can
be found in Appendix B.1. We report descriptive statistics of our sample in Table 3 in Appendix
B.2.
4.2 Results
We investigate equation (20) in several steps, varying the contents of the Xit matrix. We always
employ Predicted Broadband in our regressions. Then, we add GDP and next incorporate the
institutional variables one by one and finally, we estimate the model with all regressors.16 Since
the data on institutional variables provided by the OECD usually start two to three years later
than our data on broadband, there is trade-off between the length of the sample and the number
of regressors we use. We report the results of our estimation in Tables 1 for Self-Employment and
2 for Own Account Work as the dependent variables. Several insights emerge.
First, the signs of the coefficients on differenced and lagged Predicted Broadband are positive.
This is in line with our model predictions when the reduction of goods market frictions is the
dominant effect of Internet. We find evidence of both short- and long-term effects. Second, we
find evidence for a negative correlation between the importance of public-sector employment
and the dependent variables. This finding further corroborates the main premise of our model
that selection into self-employment is affected by income insurance that payroll jobs provide.
For both dependent variables, the F-test rejects the null hypothesis of all regression coeffi-
cients being equal to zero. We do not find convincing evidence in favor of serial correlation of
the residuals, which we test for by estimating the regressions while we explicitly allow for an
AR(1)-process in the residuals. However, the modified Wald test rejects the null hypothesis of
no groupwise heteroscedasticity. Thus, because of cross-sectional heteroscedasticity, we report
robust standard errors.
As a robustness check, we estimate a first-differenced (FD) version of equation (20) that
relies on weaker assumptions on the error term. This procedure removes the unobserved fixed
effects αi at the cost of shrinking the length of the sample. We report the result of this exercise
together with the estimation results of the specification that allows for an AR(1)-process in the
residuals in Appendix B.4.
16 All regressors, apart from Predicted Broadband enter the estimation in logarithms and differences of logarithms.






























Figure 5: Counterfactual predictions of either lack of, or delay of, broadband development for
self-employment (top) and own account work rates (bottom) in a labour-force-weigthed sample
of countries.
The dynamic and auto-regressive formulation of the estimation equation (20) makes the
inference on the quantitative significance of the estimated coefficients difficult. Thus, we
consider a hypothetical stark scenario of no broadband Internet, setting Predicted Broadband to
zero in all of the sample. Then, we calculate predicted Self-Employment and Own-Account Work
rates using estimates from column (2) of Tables 1 and 2.17 Then, we calculate counterfactual
weighted-average shares of self-employed and own-account workers in the labour force in each
year, with weights for each country given by the size of the labour force of a country in a given
year.
The results of these exercises are illustrated on Figure 5. We uncover a strong accumulative
effect of fast Internet diffusion on self-employment. If it was not for broadband Internet, the
drop in the Own Account Work rate from the initial value of 8.6% would be not to 7.9% but to
4.1% instead. The effect on Self-Employment rate is even stronger. The initial average of 15%
would drop not to 12.3% but to 4.6% in 2017.
For a more complete picture, we also consider a counterfactual of a delayed broadband
Internet roll-out, assuming it was introduced not in 1998, but in 2003 instead, forwarding the
observations of Predicted Broadband by five years. If, instead, the broadband Internet roll-out had
not been completely absent, but merely delayed by 5 years, the average Self-Employment and
Own-Account Work rates would have been reverting towards the values observed in the data
after an initial decline. The difference between the counterfactual and the observed average in
17 We chose this specification as the one with the largest number of regressors that still allows us to use our full
sample. For example, the data on Replacement Rate only start in 2001. Thus, using a richer specification would
not only shrink the size of the sample significantly, but it would also yield baseline observations of the dependent
variables that already include the effects of at least 4 years of broadband Internet roll-out.
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2017 for Self-Employment is approximately 0.7 percentage point and for Own-Account Work it is
about 0.5 percentage point. This experiment essentially removes the last five years of broadband
Internet roll-out from our sample, while the most dynamic broadband diffusion happened
between 2000 and 2005. This period is responsible for the bulk of the effect of broadband on
self-employment.
5 Conclusions
We introduce goods market frictions in a stylised model of type-of-employment choice and
apply it to understand the effects of improvements in ICT technologies on the self-employment
rate. In our model, the composition of employment is driven by income risk and firms’ ability to
insure their employees against it. We show that a reduction in goods market frictions increases
self-employment, even though firms benefit from such a reduction as well, because it decreases
the value of insurance that firms offer.
We use our theory to disentangle the goods market and labour market effects of improve-
ments in ICT technologies. Using cross-country data on the self-employment rate and pre-
existing infrastructure as instrument for broadband penetration, we find that the results confirm
the origin story of the gig economy that fast Internet prompts more self-employment. Without
the introduction of broadband Internet, the self-employment rate in our sample would fall by
about three-quarters.
Our model allows us to infer that the general equilibrium effects of overall reductions in
market frictions on self-employment, spurred by broadband Internet penetration, were due
to the goods market channel dominating the labour market channel. Moreover, allowing
for type-of-employment choice overturns the standard result that increases in labour market
matching efficiency improve the job-finding probability, and therefore provide an alternative
explanation for why improvements in labour market matching efficiency do not result in lower
unemployment rates.
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A Proofs and Derivations
A.1 General contract posting problem
The FOCs for the problem read, with χ being the multiplier on the market utility constraint:
∂Π
∂θ
: ζ ′(θ) (λ(p− w)l) = χµ′(θ) (λ (u(wl)− l) + (1− λ)u(d)− u(b)) (21)
∂Π
∂l







: −ζ(θ)λl = χµ(θ)λu′(wl)l (23)
∂Π
∂d
: −ζ(θ)(1− λ) = χµ(θ)(1− λ)u′(d) (24)
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Let’s have a closer look at equations (23) and (24). After canceling some terms they can be
combined to yield:
u′(d) = u′(wl) =⇒ d = wl. (25)
Hence, all employees receive identical consumption, but only those able to work exert effort l. d
as a control is redundant as it’s fully determined by optimal choices of w and l. Factoring in





Combining (22) and (21) yields:
φ (λp− w) l = (1− φ) (u(wl)− λl − u(b))
u′(wl)
.
A.2 Proof of Lemma 1
Proof.
1. Here we show the results regarding the characteristics of the labour income distribution,




= u′(wl) =⇒ wl = pqs.
Next, for firms to make positive profits per filled vacancy it must hold that w < λp so that
w < p, and thus qs < l follows trivially.
Finally, we will see below that for u(b) = 0, µ(θ) > λ. However, positive profits per filled
vacancy require that λp > w. Hence µ(θ)p > w, which implies µ(θ)l > qs since pqs = wl.









with [u′]−1 (·) being the inverse of marginal utility. Therefore, we have:































and VSE = λψ(p). To derive the sharing rule, we substitute (3) into (4) to arrive at:
φ (λp− w) l = (1− φ) p (u(wl)− λl − u(b)) =⇒











which equals (10) since wl = pqs, so that u(wl) − wl/p = u(pqs) − qs = ψ(p). We
shall now demonstrate that ψ(p) shows up in VLM too. Incorporating (26), the value of




















Therefore, we can write:
VLM = u(b) + µ(θ)φ [ψ(p)− u(b)] .
This equation, together with the definition of VSE, yields the workers’ indifference condi-
tion in (8). For u(b) = 0, this condition simplifies to
λ = φµ(θ),
so that λ < µ(θ) since φ < 1.
To derive the free-entry condition in (9), substitute (26) into (5) with wl = pqs, so that:
k = ζ(θ)p ((1− φ) (u(pqs)− u(b)) + φqs − qs) ,
= ζ(θ)(1− φ)p [ψ(p)− u(b)] .
Finally, we show that ψ(p) is increasing in p. Since ψ(p) = u(pqs)− qs, we have







However, in the optimum the second term is equal to zero, so that ψ′(p) = u′(pqs)qs > 0.


















A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof. The proof relies on the three equilibrium conditions (the free entry condition, workers’
indifference condition, and goods market clearing condition) and the relationships they imply
between p, θ and SE. Furthermore, we first derive the results for the special case of b = 0. The
signs of the derivatives there will help us sign the effects of model parameters in the more
general case of b > 0. Observe that the MSCC-equilibrium is a level set of a mapping described
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by the three remaining equilibrium conditions involving the utility function u, matching prob-
abilities µ(θ) and ζ(θ), and ψ(p) (which inherits smoothness from the utility function). Thus,
any element of an MSCC is at least once continuously differentiable.
The case of b = 0. Defining γ(p) = pψ(p) for brevity, the workers’ indifference and free-entry
conditions in (11) and (12) become:
λ = µ(θ)φ,
k = ζ(θ)(1− φ)γ(p).
a. Effects of λ on µ(θ) and θ. Implicitly differentiating this simplified career-choice indiffer-









Trivially, this amounts to dµ(θ)/dλ = 1 > 0, but it also reveals that dθ/dλ > 0.
b. Effect of λ on p. Next, we differentiate the free-entry condition:
0 =
[










By standard properties ζ ′(θ) < 0, so that the first term is negative. By the virtue of Lemma
1, as γ(p) = pψ(p), γ′(p) > 0. Hence, this equality can only hold if dp/dλ > 0.
c. Effect of λ on SE. Finally, consider the goods-market clearing condition in (6). We can
differentiate it with respect to λ:



















 = dqcdp dpdλ︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
.
By Assumption 1, the quantity supplied by the self-employed qs increases in p and the
converse is true for the quantity demanded qc, as stated in Lemma 1. We can also show
that dl/dp > 0 as from (10):




= (1− φ)ψ′(p) + dqs
dp
> 0. (27)
Hence, the differentiation of the goods market clearing condition can be summarised as
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the following sign restriction:
dSE
dλ
(qs − µ(θ)l) < 0. (28)
By virtue of Lemma 1 we know that µ(θ)l > qs, so that dSE/dλ > 0.
d. Effects of E on µ(θ) and θ. Now, let us consider improvements in matching efficiency in
the labour market. We have that µ(θ) = λ/φ and is constant. Hence, E cannot have any
effect of µ(θ) when b = 0. Moreover, since E increases while µ(θ) = Eµ̂(θ) is constant, we
find that dθ/dE < 0. As a result the job-filling rate ζ(θ) = Eζ̂(θ) goes up.
e. Effects of E on p and SE. Given that dθ/dE < 0, it follows that the derivative of p with
respect to E has its sign opposite to that of its counterpart derivative with respect to λ. To
see that this derivative switches sign, differentiate the free-entry condition to obtain
0 = ζ̂(θ) (1− φ) γ(p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ ζ ′(θ) (1− φ) γ(p) dθ
dE︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0





To see that the derivative of SE with respect to E switches sign too compared to its
counterpart, note that differentiating the goods-market clearing condition in (6) with
respect to E yields:
λ
dSEdE (qs − µ(θ)l) + SE dqsdp dpdE︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+(1− SE)









 = dqcdp dpdE︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
,
so that dSE/dE < 0. Because of free entry of vacancies while ζ(θ) increases, the price p
must fall. Prices fall because SE goes down, resulting in an inflow in the labour market
keeping µ(θ) unchanged.
The case of b > 0.
a. Effect of λ on p. Implicitly differentiating the workers’ indifference and free-entry condi-







φ [ψ(p)− u(b)] + µ(θ)φψ′(p) dp
dλ
, (29)
0 = ζ ′(θ)
dθ
dλ
p [ψ(p)− u(b)] + ζ(θ)
(




Suppose that dp/dλ = 0. Then, (30) requires dθ/dλ = 0 while (29) can only hold
when dθ/dλ > 0. Hence, by an argument of continuous differentiability, and using that
dp/dλ > 0 at u(b) = 0, we can rule out dp/dλ ≤ 0. Thus, dp/dλ will not change its sign
when we increase b as long as we remain in an MSCC-equilibrium.
b. Effect of λ on θ. Having established that dp/dλ > 0 in an MSCC-equilibrium, we can
turn our attention to dθ/dλ. Note in (8) that for b = 0 we have λ = µ(θ)φ, while for the
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mixed-strategy equilibrium to exist for b > 0, we need λ > µ(θ)φ. Rearranging (29) we
have:








φ (ψ(p)− u(b)) ,
which implies dθ/dλ > 0 since in any MSCC-equilibrium ψ(p) > u(b).
c. Effect of λ on SE. Note in (27) that dl/dp > 0 does not depend on b being zero, so that
the sign restriction in (28) still holds. We know that at b = 0 we have dSE/dλ > 0 and
qs − µ(θ)l < 0. Since their product must be negative, neither of those can be equal to 0 for
b > 0. From continuity we thus get that the same comparative statics hold for b > 0: the
self-employment rate SE increases in λ.
d. Effects of E. Again, we write µ(θ) = Eµ̂(θ) and ζ = Eζ̂(θ), so that the workers’ indiffer-



















p [ψ(p)− u(b)] + ζ(θ)
[




The total differentiation of the indifference condition can be rearranged to read:
(λ− µ(θ)φ)ψ′(p)











as in any MSCC-equilibrium ψ(p)− u(b) > 0, and for the free entry condition we obtain:
− ζ(θ) [ψ(p)− u(b) + pψ
′(p)]











Hence, we obtain that the effect of E on µ(θ) and ζ(θ) have opposite signs as long as
dp/dE 6= 0. Moreover, we can rule out dp/dE = 0, as this would require dµ(θ)/dE = 0
which is only possible when dθ/dE < 0, but this is inconsistent with the requirement
from (32) that dζ(θ)/dE = 0 when dp/dE = 0. In fact, dθ/dE < 0 =⇒ dζ(θ)/dE > 0.
Therefore, dp/dE < 0 at u(b) = 0 implies dp/dE < 0 also for u(b) > 0 whenever an
MSCC equilibrium exists. Hence, we conclude that also dθ/dE < 0 and dµ(θ)/dE < 0
from (31). Finally, dµ(θ)/dE < 0 and dp/dE < 0 are only consistent with more applicants
and thus dSE/dE < 0.
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A.4 One-worker firms
The contract posting problem is:
max
θ,w,l
ζ (θ) λ (p− w) l,




: ζ ′(θ)λ (p− w) l = χµ′(θ) [λ (u(wl)− l)− u(b)] (33)
∂Π
∂l







: − ζ(θ)λl = χµ(θ)λu′(wl)l (35)





while combining (35) and (33) yields the sharing rule:
φλ (p− w) l = (1− φ) p [λ (u(wl)− l)− u(b)] =⇒









As in the baseline model, we have wl = pqs so that wlp = qs. For the free-entry condition, this
implies that:





= ζ(θ)(1− φ)p [λψ(p)− u(b)] , (38)













+ u(b) ⇐⇒ λψ(p) = u(b),
so that (37) shows that l = qs and thus w = p, and (38) shows that equilibrium requires k = 0.
A.5 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. Here we fix SE and abstract from the workers’ indifference condition. Observe that the
identity wl = pqs still holds.
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Implicitly differentiating the free-entry condition in (9):
0 =
(




p [ψ(p)− u(b)] + ζ(θ)
[







p [ψ(p)− u(b)] = −ζ(θ)
[
















ζ(θ) [ψ(p)− u(b) + pψ′(p)]
dζ(θ)
dE
p [ψ(p)− u(b)] .
In this case, the responses of the job-finding probability µ(θ) and job-filling probability
ζ(θ) to increases in matching efficiency have identical signs. Increases in matching
efficiency increase firm profits, so that firms open more vacancies. Consequently, labour
market tightness increases, as the measure of workers searching for jobs is constant. The
two effects jointly increase the job-finding probability: µ(θ) increases. We have then also
derived that overall, the job-filling probability increases. Aggregate supply rises, so that
price p falls, which mitigates the increase in firm profits and market tightness. Note that it
is impossible to have dζ(θ)/dE ≤ 0, because that would imply dθ/dE > 0 and therefore
dµ(θ)/dE > 0, contradicting identical signs.
b. Effects of λ. Implicitly differentiating the free-entry condition in (9):
dζ(θ)
dλ
p [ψ(p)− u(b)] = −ζ(θ)
[




Therefore, the response of ζ(θ) has the opposite sign to the response of price p to a change
















− (SEqs + (1− SE)µ(θ)l) .
These two conditions together rule out dp/dλ ≥ 0 as that would imply dµ(θ)/dλ < 0 and
dζ(θ)/dλ ≤ 0, which cannot hold simultaneously. Therefore, it must be that dp/dλ < 0,
which implies dζ(θ)/dλ > 0 and hence dµ(θ)/dλ < 0.
34
B Data and Estimation
In this section of the Appendix we present the definitions of the variables used in estimation,
descriptive statistics of our sample, the results of the first-stage regression and the results of an
alternative estimation of equation (20).
B.1 Data Sources and Definitions
• labour Market variables - we source data from ILOSTAT on the aggregate pool of employ-
ees PE, aggregate self-employment SE, aggregate number of own account workers OA
and unemployment rates u for all population. We rely on unemployment rates because
the data on the aggregate pool of unemployed U are only available by age (which is not
available for the other labour force categories). Therefore, to construct data-counterparts
of the model self-employment rate we first compute the size of the pool of unemployed
U from the standard formula u = U/(U + E) = U/(U + PE + SE). Then, we define our
variables as follows:
– Self-employment rate: The share of self-employed in the active population, SE/(U +
PE + SE). Next, we take the logarithm of this number.
– Own-account work rate: Analogously to the self-employment rate, the share of own
account workers in the active population,OA/(U + PE + SE). Next, we take the
logarithm of this number.
• Other variables
– Broadband: We measure broadband penetration as the number of fixed-broadband
subscriptions per 100 inhabitants. Fixed-broadband subscriptions refer to fixed
subscriptions to high-speed access to the public Internet (a TCP/IP connection) at
downstream speeds equal to, or greater than, 256 kbit/s. This includes cable mo-
dem, DSL, fibre-to-the-home/building, other fixed (wired)-broadband subscriptions,
satellite broadband, and terrestrial fixed wireless broadband. This total is measured
irrespective of the method of payment. It excludes subscriptions that have access
to data communications (including the Internet) via mobile-cellular networks. It
should include fixed WiMAX and any other fixed wireless technologies. It includes
both residential subscriptions and subscriptions for organizations. Source: ITU World
Telecommunication/ICT Indicators (WTI) database 2018.
– Tax Burden: We take the tax wedge expressed in percentage points of total labour
cost as an average over the tax rate for a single person without children earning
the average wage, and a one-earner married couple at average earnings with two
children. Source: OECD
– Replacement Rate: We take the net replacement rate calculated for a couple with two
children, both earning the average wage, for an unemployment spell of a person
lasting 12 months, excluding housing benefits. Source: OECD.
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– Public Sector: We take data on Government Employment (all levels) and divide it by
Total Employment. Source: ILOSTAT.
– GDP: We measure GDP using the expenditure approach as GDP per capita in 2010
US Dollars, constant PPPs. Therefore, our variable precedes the change in the
methodology introduced in 2019. Source: OECD.
B.2 Descriptive Statistics
We report the averages and average changes of all variables in our sample in Table 3. The three
countries that experienced the strongest increase in the self-employment rates vary greatly in
terms of the pace of broadband adoption. For the Netherlands, it grew approximately by 2
percentage points per year which is one of the largest rates in the sample. The UK places in the
middle and Czech Republic at the bottom in this regard.
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Table 3: Average level and average annual change (first differences) in the self-employment rate, own-account work rate, and regressors
Self-employment Own-account Pred. broadband GDP per capita Replacement rate Tax Burden Public Sector
Level Change Level Change Level Change Level Change Level Change Level Change Level Change
Australia 19.81 -0.10 11.61 0.01 18.76 1.58 41.57 0.59 47.43 -0.28 22.68 -0.15 16.43 -0.09
Austria 14.23 -0.10 6.97 0.01 18.36 1.55 40.84 0.46 56.50 -0.08 42.57 0.06 19.72 -0.12
Belgium 14.95 -0.15 9.24 -0.06 21.25 1.79 38.89 0.41 64.61 0.19 48.27 -0.22 - -
Canada 16.77 -0.08 11.04 0.00 23.79 2.00 39.77 0.49 46.86 0.07 24.82 -0.43 18.90 0.01
Czech Republic 16.44 0.18 12.03 0.25 14.41 1.21 25.82 0.65 42.62 -1.57 33.85 0.14 23.80 -0.21
Denmark 9.83 -0.10 5.06 0.02 23.59 1.99 43.15 0.38 74.86 -0.13 32.00 -0.25 33.27 -0.14
Finland 13.51 -0.04 8.92 -0.06 21.14 1.78 37.39 0.47 66.46 -0.16 41.10 -0.21 - -
France 11.39 -0.03 6.18 0.05 20.61 1.74 35.55 0.32 73.40 -0.15 45.59 -0.14 26.74 -0.12
Germany 11.64 -0.02 5.85 0.04 21.47 1.81 39.10 0.52 73.36 -0.08 42.73 -0.12 16.07 -0.21
Greece 33.51 -0.73 21.31 -0.34 18.77 1.58 26.32 0.06 43.19 0.27 40.94 0.01 21.47 0.11
Hungary 12.78 -0.30 7.34 -0.38 15.44 1.30 21.15 0.52 39.44 -0.72 44.87 -0.62 26.39 -0.46
Ireland 18.99 -0.43 12.31 -0.25 18.09 1.52 46.25 1.74 49.10 0.09 23.32 -0.19 18.19 -0.02
Italy 24.95 -0.30 16.43 -0.14 17.07 1.44 34.87 0.03 25.71 2.81 42.33 -0.00 16.10 -0.18
Japan 13.58 -0.36 7.54 -0.13 18.23 1.53 34.93 0.30 46.51 0.01 27.58 0.10 8.89 0.03
Korea 31.15 -0.64 18.20 -0.30 19.07 1.60 27.61 0.98 35.49 -0.10 18.50 0.32 8.87 0.04
Netherlands 15.25 0.29 10.31 0.32 23.45 1.97 43.75 0.51 74.01 -0.01 34.43 -0.02 16.82 -0.00
New Zealand 18.75 -0.04 11.60 0.06 18.48 1.56 30.65 0.50 47.17 -0.33 12.36 -0.25 12.47 -0.15
Norway 8.04 -0.12 5.84 -0.08 23.64 1.99 57.47 0.44 73.26 0.01 34.03 0.01 36.17 -0.06
Portugal 23.73 -0.72 17.08 -0.53 16.37 1.38 26.55 0.19 81.28 -0.57 33.28 0.08 15.38 -0.37
Spain 16.60 -0.33 10.68 -0.22 15.95 1.34 31.33 0.35 67.73 -0.46 36.36 0.06 15.83 -0.03
Sweden 10.98 -0.06 6.74 -0.04 25.11 2.11 40.18 0.66 61.38 -0.68 42.53 -0.39 29.64 -0.05
Switzerland 17.31 -0.17 8.22 -0.06 25.23 2.12 51.21 0.49 82.94 0.02 16.39 -0.08 16.58 -0.14
United Kingdom 14.57 0.15 11.14 0.19 19.71 1.66 35.99 0.45 36.25 0.03 29.66 -0.09 19.66 -0.22
United States 7.60 -0.09 4.30 -0.02 24.77 2.08 48.13 0.60 40.31 -0.16 25.03 0.02 16.63 -0.13
Average 16.52 -0.18 10.25 -0.07 20.11 1.69 37.44 0.50 56.25 -0.08 33.13 -0.10 19.89 -0.09
Notes: GDP per capita in $1000 (level and change). All other variables are reported in percentages (for levels) and in percentage points (for changes).
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B.3 First-Stage Regression
This nonlinear regression relies on the fact that roll-out of broadband predominantly relied on
the copper wire of the voice telephony network or the coaxial cable of the cable TV network,
so that these pre-existing infrastructures provide information on the maximum attainable
broadband penetration rate (Czernich et al., 2011). Since 1998 is the first year broadband
appeared in our data, we take the voice telephony and cable TV penetration rates in 1997 as
instruments for the maximum reach of broadband.18 We take the values of these instruments
from the OECD ICT Key Indicators and present them for each country in Table 4.
Table 4: Infrastructure penetration rates (in %)
Cable TV, 1997 Voice Telephony, 1997 Predicted broadband, 2017
Australia 3.1 51.2 31.0
Austria 29.8 45.7 30.3
Belgium 88.7 48.5 35.1
Canada 68.4 61.6 39.2
Czech Republic 16.2 32.0 23.8
Denmark 49.5 63.6 38.9
Finland 37.6 55.6 34.9
France 9.6 57.6 34.0
Germany 50.5 55.0 35.4
Greece 0.6 51.6 31.0
Hungary 44.6 31.9 25.5
Ireland 46.9 42.1 29.8
Italy 0.2 44.9 28.2
Japan 11.3 47.9 30.1
Korea 5.9 52.0 31.5
Netherlands 93.1 56.6 38.7
New Zealand 0.3 50.5 30.5
Norway 57.5 62.6 39.0
Portugal 9.2 40.8 27.0
Spain 3.9 39.9 26.3
Sweden 60.5 68.0 41.4
Switzerland 87.5 64.5 41.6
United Kingdom 9.7 54.0 32.5
United States 64.8 66.0 40.9
Average 35.4 51.8 41.6
To arrive at a predicted broadband penetration rate, we first assume that the maximum
broadband penetration rate for each country i is described by:
γi = γ0 + α1tel neti,1997 + α2cable neti,1997, (41)
where tel neti,1997 and cable neti,1997 are the voice telephony and cable TV penetration rates
in 1997. These γi enter the logistic diffusion curves that we assume to predict the broadband




+ ε it. (42)
In this equation, β and τ are the coefficients for the speed and inflection point of the diffusion
18 Broadband was introduced in Canada in 1997, but we do not have access to cable TV penetration rates for 1996.
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* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.010
Note: The dependent variable is the Broadband Rate. The sample is 24 OECD countries in years
1998-2017. Standard errors in parentheses.
process, and ε it is an error term. Substituting (41) into (42), we can estimate a nonlinear first-
stage regression. The coefficients of this regression are reported in Table 5. The table shows
that all coefficients are significant at the 1% level, and that the fit is very good. Compared
to Czernich et al. (2011), nine additional years of data result in an even larger R2, a slightly
lower diffusion speed and an inflection point one year later. Cable TV has gained strength in
predicting broadband, while the coefficient for voice telephony dropped.
We use the predicted values of this nonlinear first-stage regression in our second stage
regressions. To illustrate the fit of the logistic diffusion curve, Figure 6 shows the actual and
predicted broadband penetration rates for each country. The predicted broadband penetration
rates in the last year of our sample are also reported in the last column of Table 4.
Sweden Switzerland United Kingdom United States
Netherlands New Zealand Norway Portugal Spain
Hungary Ireland Italy Japan Korea
Denmark Finland France Germany Greece
Australia Austria Belgium Canada Czech Republic
































Figure 6: Actual and predicted broadband penetration rates for 22 countries, 1998–2017.
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B.4 Robustness Checks
We estimate a first-differenced (FD) version of equation (20) that relies on weaker assumptions
on the error term. Formally, we estimate:
∆2 ln SEit = β∆2Xit + ω∆Xit−1 − γ∆ ln SEit + ∆ψt + eit, (43)
where ∆2 is the second-difference operator. This procedure removes the unobserved fixed effects
αi at the cost of shrinking the length of the sample. We follow the Andersen-Hsiao approach and
instrument the lagged dependent variable and GDP per capita with their previous observations.
We report the results of this procedure in Tables 6 and 7.
Table 6: Effects of Broadband Internet on Self-Employment Rate: FD estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ SE rate ∆ SE rate ∆ SE rate ∆ SE rate ∆ SE rate ∆ SE rate
Lagged SE rate -0.815*** -0.814*** -0.769*** -0.861*** -0.813*** -0.741***
(0.076) (0.076) (0.081) (0.121) (0.076) (0.130)
∆ Predicted B-band 0.007 0.009 0.017 0.015 0.021 0.026
(0.021) (0.021) (0.023) (0.026) (0.021) (0.026)
Lagged Predicted B-band 0.013*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.015*** 0.015***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.005) (0.006) (0.004) (0.005)
∆ GDP -0.005 -0.022 0.038 -0.019 -0.014
(0.089) (0.092) (0.095) (0.089) (0.092)
Lagged GDP 0.047 0.059 0.070 0.062 0.038
(0.091) (0.095) (0.101) (0.091) (0.099)
∆ Replacement Rate 0.004 0.034
(0.018) (0.030)
Lagged Replacement Rate -0.019 0.005
(0.025) (0.043)
∆ Public Sector -0.033 -0.029
(0.046) (0.044)
Lagged Public Sector -0.064 -0.158**
(0.057) (0.062)
∆ Tax Burden 0.056 0.074*
(0.039) (0.042)
Lagged Tax Burden 0.036 0.051
(0.050) (0.055)
Observations 408 408 360 212 384 187
No. countries 24 24 24 22 24 22
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No No No No No
R-squared within 0.007 0.007 0.003 0.042 0.004 0.025
R-squared between 0.164 0.173 0.195 0.097 0.195 0.084
χ2 p - value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, **p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
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Table 7: Effects of Broadband Internet on Own-Account Work Rate: FD estimator
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ OA rate ∆ OA rate ∆ OA rate ∆ OA rate ∆ OA rate ∆ OA rate
Lagged OA rate -0.828*** -0.828*** -0.799*** -0.836*** -0.849*** -0.818***
(0.074) (0.075) (0.080) (0.124) (0.079) (0.128)
∆ Predicted B-band 0.006 0.002 0.010 0.015 0.016 0.029
(0.027) (0.027) (0.030) (0.033) (0.028) (0.035)
Lagged Predicted B-band 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015*** 0.015** 0.017*** 0.017**
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.006) (0.007)
∆ GDP -0.196* -0.209* -0.109 -0.198* -0.159
(0.117) (0.120) (0.122) (0.117) (0.123)
Lagged GDP -0.132 -0.130 -0.090 -0.124 -0.141
(0.120) (0.123) (0.128) (0.120) (0.129)
∆ Replacement Rate -0.002 0.032
(0.023) (0.040)
Lagged Replacement Rate -0.023 0.001
(0.032) (0.057)
∆ Public Sector -0.035 -0.038
(0.059) (0.059)
Lagged Public Sector -0.032 -0.150*
(0.073) (0.083)
∆ Tax Burden 0.015 0.001
(0.051) (0.055)
Lagged Tax Burden 0.049 0.032
(0.065) (0.071)
Observations 408 408 360 212 384 187
No. countries 24 24 24 22 24 22
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE No No No No No No
R-squared within 0.005 0.006 0.002 0.047 0.001 0.030
R-squared between 0.044 0.031 0.050 0.004 0.049 0.006
χ2 p - value 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
Because of lagged variables, first-differencing removes not one, but two years of data. For
both dependent variables, only the long run effects of Predicted Broadband are significant with
the same signs and interpretation as in the case of the FE estimator. The short-term effects of
Predicted Broadband are positive, but insignificant. The negative long-run effect of Public Sector
on the dependent variables is also present and significant. In columns (2), (3) and (6) of Table 7
we find a negative short-term effect of GDP on Own Account Work rate.
We also estimate the system of equations:
∆ ln SEit = β∆Xit + ωXit−1 − γ ln SEit + αi + ψt + ε it, (44)
ε it = ρε it−1 + eit, (45)
allowing explicitly for serial correlation in residuals. We report the results of this exercise in
Tables 8 and 9.
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Table 8: Effects of Broadband Internet on Self-Employment Rate: AR(1) residuals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ SE rate ∆ SE rate ∆ SE rate ∆ SE rate ∆ SE rate ∆ SE rate
Lagged SE rate -0.094*** -0.096*** -0.138*** -0.239*** -0.122*** -0.279***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.027) (0.039) (0.025) (0.048)
∆ Predicted B-band 0.025*** 0.026*** 0.025* 0.047*** 0.019 0.077***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.014) (0.011) (0.012) (0.020)
Lagged Predicted B-band 0.003*** 0.003*** 0.004* 0.008*** 0.002 0.014***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002) (0.003)
∆ GDP 0.003 -0.016 0.003 0.003 -0.020
(0.083) (0.088) (0.081) (0.085) (0.086)
Lagged GDP 0.026 0.033 -0.021 0.033 -0.003
(0.030) (0.038) (0.038) (0.034) (0.047)
∆ Replacement Rate 0.004 0.040
(0.017) (0.032)
Lagged Replacement Rate -0.013 0.006
(0.013) (0.027)
∆ Public Sector -0.036 -0.055
(0.044) (0.046)
Lagged Public Sector -0.134*** -0.179***
(0.031) (0.040)
∆ Tax Burden 0.051 0.062
(0.039) (0.042)
Lagged Tax Burden -0.003 -0.014
(0.023) (0.029)
Observations 432 432 360 227 384 189
No. countries 24 24 24 22 24 22
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RSS 0.290 0.290 0.242 0.091 0.251 0.071
MSS 0.035 0.036 0.036 0.032 0.037 0.029
RMSE 0.027 0.027 0.027 0.021 0.026 0.021
R-squared within 0.108 0.110 0.131 0.263 0.128 0.292
R-squared between 0.107 0.112 0.161 0.017 0.143 0.020
AR(1) coefficient ρ 0.118 0.118 0.124 0.113 0.133 0.227
αi share of variance 0.714 0.757 0.841 0.952 0.801 0.974
Durbin-Watson 1.795 1.795 1.795 1.814 1.776 1.668
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
We find that the results reported in the main text are robust. In the majority of the specifi-
cations we find significant and positive long- and short-term effects of Predicted Broadband on
Self-Employment and Own Account Work rates. The size of the estimated coeffcients in columns
(2) in Tables 8 and 9 are very similar to the ones we report in the main text. The negative
long-run effects of Public Sector remain negative and significant as well.
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Table 9: Effects of Broadband Internet on Own-Account Work Rate: AR(1) residuals
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
∆ OA rate ∆ OA rate ∆ OA rate ∆ OA rate ∆ OA rate ∆ OA rate
Lagged OA rate -0.133*** -0.131*** -0.141*** -0.284*** -0.122*** -0.307***
(0.021) (0.021) (0.026) (0.044) (0.024) (0.054)
∆ Predicted B-band 0.014 0.016 0.024 0.064*** 0.019 0.079***
(0.011) (0.011) (0.017) (0.015) (0.014) (0.026)
Lagged Predicted B-band 0.002* 0.003** 0.004 0.011*** 0.003 0.013***
(0.001) (0.001) (0.003) (0.002) (0.002) (0.004)
∆ GDP -0.151 -0.210* -0.104 -0.183* -0.159
(0.109) (0.110) (0.104) (0.109) (0.113)
Lagged GDP 0.020 0.005 -0.056 0.005 -0.056
(0.038) (0.045) (0.050) (0.041) (0.060)
∆ Replacement Rate -0.001 0.032
(0.022) (0.043)
Lagged Replacement Rate -0.011 -0.005
(0.016) (0.035)
∆ Public Sector -0.046 -0.075
(0.056) (0.062)
Lagged Public Sector -0.155*** -0.194***
(0.040) (0.052)
∆ Tax Burden 0.009 -0.010
(0.051) (0.056)
Lagged Tax Burden 0.007 -0.010
(0.028) (0.037)
Observations 432 432 360 227 384 189
No. countries 24 24 24 22 24 22
Year FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Country FE Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
RSS 0.514 0.511 0.395 0.151 0.430 0.123
MSS 0.074 0.078 0.056 0.056 0.052 0.042
RMSE 0.035 0.035 0.034 0.027 0.034 0.028
R-squared within 0.127 0.132 0.123 0.272 0.108 0.253
R-squared between 0.047 0.058 0.102 0.012 0.085 0.015
AR(1) coefficient ρ 0.072 0.071 0.058 0.127 0.059 0.193
αi share of variance 0.737 0.755 0.787 0.959 0.729 0.966
Durbin-Watson 1.874 1.876 1.905 1.777 1.902 1.710
Standard errors in parentheses, * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, ***p < 0.01
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C Additional Results (not for publication)
C.1 ODE representation of an MSCC equilibrium when u(b) > 0.
When u(b) > 0, it is no longer possible to separate p and θ as easily as before. However, one
can solve for θ as a function of p:
θ =
(1− φ) p (λψ(p)− u(b))
φk
,
and use this equation to arrive at the equilibrium price p as an implicit function of b:
λψ(p) = u(b) + µ
(
(1− φ) p (λψ(p)− u(b))
φk
)
φ (ψ(p)− u(b)) .
By differentiating this equation with respect to u(b), we arrive at a non-autonomous ordinary
differential equation of p in u(b) with the initial condition given by p∗ implied by equations
(11) and (12). How far the solution p(u(b)) can be extended with respect to u(b), yielding
equilibrium SE ∈ (0, 1), depends on the initial condition and the utility function u(c) that
implies in a particular ψ(p).




= 1 + µ′(θ)
dθ
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0 = ζ ′(θ)
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These ODE equations pin down the MSCC equilibria, as long as the solution to this set of
equations features SE ∈ (0, 1). For a special case of u(c) = 2
√
c in which ψ(p) = p (see
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dub





















We can sign the derivative responses to ub at ub = 0 exploiting λ = µ(θ)φ and removing ub





































Thus, for this particular specification of u(c) = 2
√
c, we obtain that introducing u(b) > 0
initially leads to a drop in market tightness, so that the job finding probability drops and
the market clearing price falls. Hence, despite smaller fraction of applicants finding jobs, the
aggregate supply increases. This is only consistent with there being fewer self-employed.
C.2 Analytical solution of the model for particular matching and utility functions
Let u(c) = 2
√
c, g(q) = B q
2
2 and M(A, V) = E
√





while condition (2) is:
qs = p.
The function ψ(p) = u(pqs) − qs is simply a linear function of the price, ψ(p) = p. The





θ. The equation that pins down the level of effort is:

















We are left with three equations (workers’ indifference, goods market clearing, vacancy free














































Finally, the goods market clearing condition is:

























































C.3 Congestion in the goods market
To highlight the main mechanisms, we assume in the baseline model that the probability to enter
the perfectly competitive goods market is exogenous. In this section, we relax this assumption
and make the probability to enter the goods market a function of the mass of prospective sellers
in the goods market (the self-employed and one-worker production units) as in Rocheteau
and Wright (2005). To this end, we must adjust the notation slightly. We denote EL and θL as
matching efficiency and tightness in the labour market, and EG and θG will be their counterparts






1− SE , (46)
θG = SE + (1− SE)µ(θL), (47)
because the mass of buyers is normalised to 1. Just as we have ζ(θL) = EL ζ̂(θL) with ζ̂ ′(θL) < 0
and ζ̂ ′′(θL) > 0, and µ(θL) = ELµ̂(θL) with µ̂′(θL) > 0 and µ̂′′(θL) < 0, we denote λ(θG) =
EGλ̂(θG) and assume λ̂′(θG) < 0, λ̂′′(θG) > 0 and λ̂(0) = 1.
The decision problem of buyers is unaffected by this extension and the aggregate demand
equation is still given by (1). The value of self-employment is:
V(qs; p, θG) = λ(θG) (u(pqs)− qs) ,
but the optimal production decision is independent of λ(θG) and is again given by (2). Regard-
ing the optimal contract-posting problem in the labour market, the firms and workers take
λ(θG) as given, hence the condition (3) is unaffected while (4) and (5) are, respectively:
φ (λ(θG)p− w) l = (1− φ)
u(wl)− λ(θG)l − u(b)
u′(wl)
, (48)
k = ζ (θL) (λ(θG)p− w) l. (49)
Therefore, we are in position to define the MSCC equilibrium with congestion in the goods
market.
Definition 4 (MSCC equilibrium with congestion in the goods market) A mixed-strategy
career-choice equilibrium (MSCC-equilibrium) with congestion in the goods market is a tuple
(SE, p, qs, qc, w, l, θL, θG) such that:
• 0 < SE < 1, 0 < θL, both types of employment are chosen in equilibrium and active in the goods
market,
• given SE and θL, tightness in the goods market θG is given by (47),
• given p, each consumer demands qc as prescribed by equation (1), each visible self-employed sells
qs given by equation (2),
• given p and θG, θL, w, l satisfy equations (3), (48) and (49),
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• given θL, θG, w, l, qc and qs, p and SE simultaneously clear the goods market and make workers
indifferent between self-employment and searching for a job at a firm:
λ(θG) (SEqs + (1− SE)µ(θL)l) = qc, (50)
VSE = λ(θG) (u(pqs)− qs) = µ (θL) (u(wl)− λ(θG)l) + (1− µ(θL))u(b) = VLM. (51)
Observe that the sole adjustment in the derivations leading to Lemma 1, and the results
provided in this Lemma, is to replace the exogenous λ with an endogenous λ(θG). Hence, it is
still the case that earnings are equalised, wl = pqs and that workers staffing visible production
units produce more than the self-employed, l > qs. Furthermore, for u(b) = 0 we have that
λ(θG) < µ(θL), securing income is more likely for applicants than for the self-employed, and
that µ(θL)l > qs, the expected production per capita of applicants exceeds that of the self-
employed. The function ψ(p) is not affected by the endogeneity of λ(θG) either. Similarly, the
dimensionality of the equilibrium proposed in Definition 4 can be reduced to (θG, θL, SE, p) that
satisfy the counterparts of (11) and (12):
λ(θG) = µ(θL)φ,
k = ζ(θL)(1− φ)pψ(p),
the goods-market clearing condition (51), and the definition of goods market tightness (47).
The equilibria for the baseline model can be regarded as equilibria of the model with
congestion in the goods market. Let (SE∗, p∗, θ∗L) be the solution to the baseline model for given
λ, k and φ. Then, SE∗ and θ∗L pin down θ
∗
G in the equilibrium of the model with congestion for
the same k and φ. The only necessary adjustment is then to pick EG such that λ = λ(θ∗G).
Imposing Assumption 1 guarantees uniqueness of the equilibrium again. To see this,
consider the thought experiment summarised in Figure 3 and in Equation (13). Suppose we
start with an MSCC-equilibrium with congestion in the goods market and investigate the
effects of an off-equilibrium increase in self-employment. This shift towards self-employment
generates the price and labour-market tightness effects, exactly as in the baseline model, and























Relocating a worker from the labour market to self-employment removes a fraction of µ(θL)
of a production unit and increases the pool of the self-employed by one worker. The resulting
increase in goods market tightness makes the self-employed worse off, while large firms and
applicants are not directly affected by congestion in the goods market because the equilibrium
employment contract features income insurance.
Regarding the comparative statics in Theorem 2, let us differentiate workers’ indifference,
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From (52) we get that the effect of an increase in the ease of entry to the goods market must
have the same sign for λ(θG) and µ(θL). So, both either decrease or increase. From (53) we
again obtain that price p and θL move in the same direction. So, higher tightness θL must be
compensated with a higher price p. The major complication is that in the model with exogenous
λ, we knew right away that dθL/dλ > 0 and so dp/dλ > 0. Therefore, we have to consider all
possible combinations of the effects of EG on SE and θL:
1. dSEdEG > 0,
dθL
dEG
< 0: The latter implies that dλ(θG)/dEG < 0 because of (52). Thus, fewer
workers make it to the goods market, and among those that do, per capita produc-
tion decreases, because self-employment increases. Aggregate supply increases because
µ(θ)l > qs so that prices must rise, while the free-entry condition requires the opposite to
happen. Consequently, this case can be discarded.
2. dSEdEG > 0,
dθL
dEG
> 0: This combination we find in the baseline model. Higher EG prompts
more self-employment which increases labour market tightness. The only additional
feature of the model is that the increase in SE is such that the increase in θG does not
overcome the direct effect of EG on λ(θG).
3. dSEdEG < 0,
dθL
dEG
< 0: Again, (52) requires that dλ(θG)dEG < 0. However, a decrease in λ(θG)
leads to a contradiction. The decrease in self-employment and drop in the job-finding
probability unambiguously lead to an increase in λ(θG), on top of the direct effect of
higher EG. Consequently, this case can also be discarded.
4. dSEdEG < 0,
dθL
dEG
> 0: By the virtue of (52), we now must have dλ(θG)/dEG > 0 for workers’
indifference. Hence, we have more workers visible in the goods market, and per worker
production increases. Aggregate supply increases because µ(θ)l > qs so that prices should
decrease, but the free-entry condition in (53) requires price to rise. Consequently, this case
can be discarded as well.
Having eliminated three possible effects of an increase in EG, we still need to consider the lack
of an effect on either SE or θL:
1. dθLdEG = 0: Now the free-entry condition yields that dp/dEG = 0, the indifference condition
implies that dλ(θG)/dEG = 0, and the goods market clearing condition then leads to
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dSE/dEG = 0. However, this leads to a contradiction since dλ(θG)/dEG = 0 requires
dθG/dEG > 0, while the mass of self-employed and one-worker productive units is fixed.
2. dSEdEG = 0,
dθL
dEG
> 0: The indifference condition now implies that the probability to enter the
goods market increases (the direct effect dominates the indirect effect). As more employees
find jobs while self-employment remains constant, aggregate supply unambiguously
increases, and prices fall. However, falling prices and an increase in labour market
tightness violate the free-entry condition.
3. dSEdEG = 0,
dθL
dEG
< 0: Workers’ indifference requires the probability to enter the goods market
to drop. However, there are fewer one-worker production units and the same number of
self-employed, resulting in a clear contradiction again.
Thus, we have arrived at dSE/dEG > 0 and dµ(θL)/dEG > 0 as well, exactly as in Theorem
2. For the effects of EL, analogously to (52), we have that the sign of the effect of an increase in

















Now, unlike in the baseline model with u(b) = 0, we can rule out dµ(θ)/dEL = 0, because
condition (55) would then require that dλ(θG)/dEL = 0 as well. However, the only way to cancel
the direct effect of EL on µ(θL) is via a lower self-employment rate, but as long as µ(θL) < 1, a
lower self-employment rate unambiguously increases λ(θG). In fact, this argument also rules
out dµ(θ)/dEL < 0. Thus, the only remaining possibility is that improvements in matching
efficiency in the labour market decrease the self-employment rate, dSE/dEL < 0 and increase the
job-finding probability, dµ(θ)/dEL > 0. However, the inflow from self-employment dampens
the effect of an increase in the matching efficiency in the labour market on the job-finding
probability, relative to a model with a fixed self-employment rate, as in the FCC-equilibrium
that we consider in the main text.
C.4 Dynamic Model
C.4.1 Model setup
Consumers Denoting the discount factor by β, consumers essentially face a static problem:
VB = max
qc
qc − g(pqc) + βVB.










λ (u (pqs)− qs) + βVSE,





so that, similar to the static model,
















Payroll Employment Production cannot be stored, and employment relationships last until
destruction with probability δ. Denoting the value of being employed by VE,
VE = λ (u (wl)− l) + (1− λ)u(d) + β
(




λ (u (wl)− l) + (1− λ)u(d) + βδVLM
1− β(1− δ) , (58)
which can be substituted in the value of entering the labour market:





Collecting terms results in the following representation:
VLM =
µ (θ) [λ (u (wl)− l) + (1− λ)u(d)] + (1− µ(θ)) (1− β(1− δ)) u(b)
(1− β) [1− (1− µ(θ)) β(1− δ)] . (59)
Firms We anticipate perfect insurance, and substitute wl for d. Because of free entry, unfilled
vacancies have no value. The value of a filled vacancy to a firm is
V J = (λp− w) l + β(1− δ)V J ,
V J =
(λp− w) l
1− β(1− δ) ,
so that the free entry condition is
k = ζ(θ)V J = ζ(θ)
(λp− w) l
1− β(1− δ) . (60)
In the competitive search environment of the labour market, the expected value of going to
a sub-market cannot be less than the market utility VLM. Following the standard argument
in such models with homogeneous workers and firms, there will be exactly one sub-market
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active. Given p, the optimal contract chooses (θ, w, l) to solve the constrained optimisation






1− β(1− δ) ≡ Π
subject to
µ (θ) [u (wl)− λl] + (1− µ(θ)) (1− β(1− δ)) u(b)
(1− β) [1− (1− µ(θ)) β(1− δ)] ≥ V
LM.





1− β(1− δ) = χµ
′(θ)
u (wl)− λl − (1− β(1− δ)) u(b)− (1− β)β(1− δ)VLM






1− β(1− δ) = χµ(θ)
u′(wl)w− λ
(1− β) [1− (1− µ(θ)) β(1− δ)] (62)
∂Π
∂w
: − ζ(θ) l
1− β(1− δ) = χµ(θ)
u′(wl)l
(1− β) [1− (1− µ(θ)) β(1− δ)] (63)
The FOC in (63) can be rewritten to obtain an expression for the discounted multiplier
χ
(1− β) [1− (1− µ(θ)) β(1− δ)] =
−ζ(θ)
µ(θ)u′(wl)(1− β(1− δ)) . (64)
Substituting (64) in (62), yields
ζ(θ)
λp− w
1− β(1− δ) =
−ζ(θ)µ(θ) (u′(wl)w− λ)
µ(θ)u′(wl)(1− β(1− δ)) ,




u′(wl) = 1/p. (65)
C.4.2 Model characterization
Lemma 1
1. Combining (57) and (65) shows that, as for a static model,
u′(wl) = 1/p = u′ (pqs)⇔ wl = pqs
As in the static model, free entry requires λp > w, so that p > w and thus qs < l.
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2. Substituting (64) in (61), we can solve for the sharing rule
ζ ′(θ)(λp− w)l
1− β(1− δ) =
−ζ(θ)µ′(θ)
µ(θ)




(λp− w)l = µ
′(θ)
µ(θ)













1− (1− µ(θ)) β(1− δ)
)
u (wl)− λl − u(b)
u′(wl)
φ(λp− w)l = (1− φ) 1− β(1− δ)
1− (1− µ(θ)) β(1− δ)
u (wl)− λl − u(b)
u′(wl)
(67)
since φ = −θζ ′(θ)/ζ(θ) is the elasticity of the vacancy-filling probability. Using (67), we
obtain an expression for expected production
λl =
(1− φ) [1− β(1− δ)] (u (wl)− u(b)) + [1− β(1− δ) (1− µ(θ))] φwl/p
1− β(1− δ) (1− µ(θ)φ)
=
(1− φ) [1− β(1− δ)] (u (wl)− u(b)− wl/p)
1− β(1− δ) (1− µ(θ)φ) + wl/p, (68)
=
(1− φ) [1− β(1− δ)] [ψ(p)− u(b)]
1− β(1− δ) (1− µ(θ)φ) + qs. (69)
which is the dynamic equivalent of (10), showing that the expected production λl is larger
than qs, and not only just l:
Equalizing (1− β)VSE = (1− β)VLM, workers are indifferent if and only if
λψ(p) =
µ (θ) [λ (u (wl)− l) + (1− λ)u(d)] + (1− µ(θ)) (1− β(1− δ)) u(b)
1− (1− µ(θ)) β(1− δ)
Now we express the RHS as a function of ψ(p) too. Using (65), (66) can be rewritten and
solved for expected production as a function of VLM
φ(λp− w)l = (1− φ)p
[
u (wl)− λl − (1− β(1− δ)) u(b)− β(1− δ)(1− β)VLM
]
λl = (1− φ)
[
u (wl)− (1− β(1− δ)) u(b)− β(1− δ)(1− β)VLM
]
+ φwl/p







u (wl)− (1− β(1− δ)) u(b)− β(1− δ)(1− β)VLM
] }
+ (1− µ(θ)) (1− β(1− δ)) u(b)
(1− β) [1− (1− µ(θ)) β(1− δ)]
=
(1− β(1− δ)) u(b) + µ(θ)φ [u (wl)− wl/p− (1− β(1− δ)) u(b)]
(1− β) [1− (1− µ(θ)φ) β(1− δ)]
Since wl = pqs,we know that u (wl)− wl/p = ψ(p). Worker indifference thus holds iff
λψ(p) =
(1− β(1− δ)) u(b) + µ(θ)φ [ψ(p)− (1− β(1− δ)) u(b)]
1− (1− µ(θ)φ) β(1− δ) . (70)
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For future reference, note that (1− β)VLM in (70) can be written as a weighted average of
the time spent in unemployment and employment:
(1− β)VLM = (1− µ(θ)φ) (1− β(1− δ)) u(b) + µ(θ)φψ(p)
(1− µ(θ)φ) (1− β(1− δ)) + µ(θ)φ ,
= (1−ω)u(b) + ωψ(p),
with ω ∈ (0, 1) given by
ω ≡ µ(θ)φ
1− (1− µ(θ)φ) β(1− δ) . (71)
We express the free-entry condition as a function of ψ(p) too. Substituting (68) into (60):
k =
ζ(θ)p(1− φ) [1− β(1− δ)] (u (wl)− u(b)− wl/p)
(1− β(1− δ)) [1− β(1− δ) (1− µ(θ)φ)] +
ζ(θ)
[
p wlp − wl
]
1− β(1− δ) ,
= ζ(θ)
(1− φ)p [ψ(p)− u(b)]
1− β(1− δ) (1− µ(θ)φ) . (72)
Equilibrium conditions (69), (70) and (72) make up the dynamic equivalents of those in
Lemma 1.
Finally, we can show that for b = 0, pursuing a career in payroll employment is not as
risky as self-employment, in the sense that
λ <
µ(θ)




µ(θ)φ + (1− µ(θ)φ) [1− β(1− δ)] ≡ ω.
Therefore, the inequality to be shown holds iff the denominator
µ(θ)φ + (1− µ(θ)φ) [1− β(1− δ)] > φ [µ(θ) + δ(1− µ(θ))] ,
1− µ(θ)φ− β + βδ + βµ(θ)φ− βδµ(θ)φ > φδ− δµ(θ)φ,
1− β− (1− β)µ(θ)φ > δ [φ− β− (1− β)µ(θ)φ] ,
which is true because both δ ∈ (0, 1) and φ ∈ (0, 1). For u(b) = 0, we can thus fully rank
quantities produced according to:
qs < λl <
µ (θ)
µ (θ) + δ (1− µ(θ)) l < l.
Equilibrium construction With b = 0, we have worker indifference simply for
λ =
µ(θ)φ
1− (1− µ(θ)φ) β(1− δ) , (74)
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which pins down θ as a function of the matching function and the parameters λ, φ, and β(1− δ).
The free-entry condition simplifies to
k =
ζ(θ)(1− φ)
1− (1− µ(θ)φ) β(1− δ) pψ(p) (75)
For a given θ, the free-entry condition can then be solved for p. Then, for fixed θ and fixed p,
we can compute qs and l.
Stocks and flows Since there is a unit square of workers, we have at any t
SEt + Ut + Et = 1.
End-of-period unemployment Ut is then given by
Ut = (1− µ (θt)) [1− SEt − (1− δ)Et−1] = (1− µ (θt)) [Ut−1 + δEt−1 + SEt−1 − SEt] ,
where θt = Vt/At with
At = 1− SEt − (1− δ)Et−1 = Ut−1 + δEt−1 − ∆SEt.
End-of-period employment Et is given by
Et = µ(θt) [1− SEt − (1− δ)Et−1] + (1− δ)Et−1,
so that the set of state variables can be reduced to Et−1. Given Et−1, workers split between SEt
and At, and a given At results in Ut and Et.
Steady state In steady state, ∆Ut = ∆SEt = 0, so that A = U + δE, and
µ(θ) [U + δE] = δE = ζ(θ)V
Exploiting that SE + U + E = 1, we can characterize
U =
δ (1− µ(θ))




µ (θ) + δ (1− µ(θ)) [1− SE] (77)
Market clearing in steady state thus requires
λ
(
SEqs + (1− SE)
µ (θ)
µ (θ) + δ (1− µ(θ)) l
)
= qc. (78)
Theorem 2 First we characterize the comparative statics for the case in which u(b) = 0.
Effects of λ on θ and µ(θ). Implicitly differentiating worker indifference in (74) with respect to
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λ,
1 = µ′(θ)φ︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
1− β(1− δ)




shows that dθ/dλ > 0, so that also dµ(θ)/dλ > 0.
Effect of λ on p. Define pψ(p) ≡ γ(p), and implicitly differentiate the free-entry condition in
(75) with respect to λ
0 = ζ ′(θ)(1− φ)γ(p) dθ
dλ
+ ζ(θ)(1− φ)γ′(p) dp
dλ
− kµ′(θ)φβ(1− δ) dθ
dλ
=⇒kµ′(θ)φβ(1− δ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0










since Lemma 1 implies that γ′(p) > 0, so that dp/dλ > 0.


















(1− φ) [1− β(1− δ)]ψ′(p)







since supply by the self-employed responds positively to price increases, so that dl/dp > 0.





(1− φ) [1− β(1− δ)] [ψ(p)− u(b)] β(1− δ)φµ′(θ)
[1− β(1− δ) (1− µ(θ)φ)]2
> 0, (80)
which can be understood from the increase in recruiting costs when θ increases. We can


















Finally, consider the effect of λ on SE. Implicitly differentiating the market-clearing
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condition in (78)
SEqs + (1− SE)
µ (θ)











































µ (θ) + δ (1− µ(θ)) l
]
< 0. (81)
We have already shown that qs < lµ (θ) / (µ (θ) + δ (1− µ(θ))) for b = 0, so that we can
conclude that dSE/dλ > 0.




1− (1− Eµ̂(θ)φ) β(1− δ)
Implicitly differentiating worker indifference with respect to E













shows that dθ/dE < 0. Since the left-hand side is zero, and θ is the only variable that can
possibly adjust, it is immediate that dµ(θ)/dE = 0.
Effects of E on p and SE. Differentiating the free-entry condition in (75) with respect to E
results in
0 = (1− φ)
[







− kβ(1− δ)φ dµ(θ)
dE
=⇒
0 = ζ̂(θ)γ(p)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0










because dµ(θ)/dE = 0, so that we conclude that dp/dE < 0. Analogous to above but


















since dl/dp and dl/dθ in (79) and (80) are unchanged. Differentiating the market-clearing
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 = dqcdp dpdE︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
,
so that dSE/dE < 0.
Finally, we characterize the comparative statics for the case in which u(b) > 0










ψ(p)− (1− β(1− δ)) u(b)
1− (1− µ(θ)φ) β(1− δ)
dθ
dλ
− µ′(θ)φβ(1− δ) (1− µ(θ)φ) (1− β(1− δ)) u(b) + µ(θ)φψ(p)









(1−ωβ(1− δ)) [ψ(p)− u(b)]





using the definition of ω in (71). Note in (74) that for b = 0 we have λ = ω, while
(70) shows that for the mixed-strategy equilibrium to exist for b > 0, we need λ > ω.
Implicitly differentiating the free-entry condition in (72), we arrive at:




ψ(p)− u(b) + pψ′(p)
] dp
dλ


















Suppose that dp/dλ = 0. Then, (83) requires dθ/dλ = 0 while (82) can only hold
when dθ/dλ > 0. Hence, by an argument of continuous differentiability, and using that
dp/dλ > 0 at u(b) = 0, we can rule out dp/dλ ≤ 0. Thus, dp/dλ will not change its sign
when we increase b as long as we remain in an MSCC-equilibrium, so that dp/dλ > 0.
Then it is immediate from (83) that also dθ/dλ > 0 since in any MSCC-equilibrium
ψ(p) > u(b).
Effect of λ on SE. Note in (79) and (80) that dl/dp > 0 and dl/dθ > 0 do not depend on b
being zero, so that the sign restriction in (81) still holds. We know that at b = 0 we have
dSE/dλ > 0 and qs − lµ (θ) / (µ (θ) + δ (1− µ(θ))) < 0. Since their product must be
negative, neither of those can be equal to 0 for b > 0. From continuity we thus get that the
same comparative statics hold for b > 0: the self-employment rate SE increases in λ.
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Effects of E. Again, we write µ(θ) = Eµ̂(θ) and ζ = Eζ̂(θ), so that the workers’ indifference







µ̂(θ) + µ′(θ) dθdE
)
[ψ(p)− (1− β(1− δ)) u(b)] + µ(θ)φψ′(p) dpdE







(1− µ(θ)φ) (1− β(1− δ)) u(b) + µ(θ)φψ(p)
[1− (1− µ(θ)φ) β(1− δ)]2
=⇒
(λ−ω)ψ′(p) [1− (1− µ(θ)φ) β(1− δ)]














using the definition of ω in (71), as in any MSCC-equilibrium φ(p) − u(b) > 0. The
free-entry condition in (72) yields:
0 =
(




(1− φ)p [ψ(p)− u(b)]
+ ζ(θ)(1− φ)
[




























Suppose that dp/dE = 0. Then, (84) requires dµ(θ)/dE = 0, which can only be the case
for dθ/dE < 0 and thus dζ(θ)/dE > 0. However, when dp/dE = 0 and dµ(θ)/dE = 0,
(85) can only hold for dζ(θ)/dE = 0. Consequently, we can rule out dp/dE = 0, and
dp/dE < 0 at u(b) = 0 implies dp/dE < 0 also for u(b) > 0 whenever an MSCC
equilibrium exists. Hence, we conclude from (84) that also dµ(θ)/dE < 0, and thus
dθ/dE < 0 and dζ(θ)/dE > 0. Finally, dµ(θ)/dE < 0 and dp/dE < 0 are only consistent
with more applicants and thus dSE/dE < 0.
58
